Patricia Maclachlan (University of Texas at Austin), “Mechanisms of Resistance: Informal Institutional Impediments to Japanese Postal Privatization”

U.S. ET: November 9 (Thursday), 8 – 9 PM

JST: November 10 (Friday), 10 – 11 AM

Zoom Registration: Link.

Paper is available here.

Author: Patricia Maclachlan (University of Texas at Austin)

Abstract:
Nearly two decades after Koizumi Jun’ichirō passed his landmark legislation, the postal privatization process has lost its momentum. Japan Post Mail is in the red, the profit margins of the banking and insurance firms are shrinking, government remains by far the largest shareholder in the two financial firms, and stories abound of fraud and wasteful spending. Of course, no reform agenda ever lives up the intentions of its architects. But what exactly explains these developments? One answer, I argue, is the impact of enduring informal institutional practices (e.g., amakudari and quotas (noruma) for the postmaster’s mobilization of votes) on the privatization process. This paper demonstrates that by functioning as vehicles for anti-reformist elite coordination and competition across the economic, political, and bureaucratic domains connected to the postal services, these unofficial but enduring practices have weakened political momentum behind the privatization agenda and hence the implementation of privatization rules and principles. In addition to presenting new explanations for anti-reformist interest group influence within the Japanese political economy, this study offers theoretical insights into the nature, functions, and significance of informal institutions in “coordinated market economies.”

Presenter: Patricia Maclachlan (University of Texas at Austin)

Discussants: Daniel M. Brinks (University of Texas at Austin) and Steven Vogel (University of California, Berkeley)

Chair: Amy Catalinac (New York University)