U.S. ET: November 13 (Thursday), 8 – 9 PM
JST: November 14 (Friday), 10 – 11 AM
Zoom Registration: Link
Paper: Link
Author(s): Erik H. Wang (New York University) and Weiwen Yin (University of Macau)
Abstract:
How does state-building fail? Existing scholarship emphasizes both territorial reach and administrative capacity as keys to state-building, but these dimensions do not always progress in tandem. We argue that when territorial penetration outpaces administrative capacity, it will generate governance demands that the state is ill-equipped to manage, ultimately fueling unrest. We test this argument in Japan under the Kamakura Shogunate (1185 – 1333). In preparation for the Mongol invasions, the Shogunate expanded direct rule into previously autonomous regions, despite its own underdeveloped bureaucratic infrastructure. Our difference-in-differences analyses show that this effort triggered rebellions against the Shogunate, identifying increased governance burdens as the key mechanism. These centrifugal forces culminated in long-term state decay, evidenced by the proliferation of castles after the Shogunate’s collapse particularly in those regions. Our findings highlight the conundrum of premature state-building: without sufficient administrative capacity, efforts to strengthen central authority can paradoxically weaken the state’s long-term viability.
Presenter: Erik H. Wang (New York University)
Discussants: Emily Sellars (Yale University); Junichi Yamasaki (Kyoto University)
Chair: Christina Davis (Harvard University)