Legacies of the Atomic Bombings: Wartime Violence and Foreign Policy Attitudes

Masanori Kikuchi*

February 18, 2025

Abstract

What are the consequences of extreme violence during inter-state war on citizens' long-term political attitudes and values? While scholars have identified prolonged effects of violence exposure on attitudes toward in-group and out-group members, we understand less about how violence shapes broader views about war itself. I theorize that large-scale victimization influences foreign policy attitudes by reinforcing beliefs about war's immorality, fostering dovish attitudes, and that these beliefs are transmitted through familial, community, and national-level channels. Focusing on the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki during World War II, I conducted an original survey across contemporary Japan to examine these expectations. Empirical analyses provide strong evidence that individuals belonging to victimized communities oppose nuclear weapons, support international cooperation, and see war as immoral. The findings highlight how traumatic wartime violence formulates long-term foreign policy attitudes, showcasing both the influence and limitations of family and community in transmitting political attitudes across generations.

Word count: 7,696

Keywords: public opinion toward foreign policy; legacies of war; inter-generational transmissions; Japan

*Ph.D. Student at Department of Political Science, Washington University in St. Louis (m.kikuchi@wustl.edu). Earlier versions of the manuscript were presented at the Peace Science Society 2024, ISA–Midwest 2024, and the Japanese Society for Quantitative Political Science 2025 Winter. I appreciate Deniz Aksoy, David Carter, Ted Enamorado, John Ishiyama, Masaru Kohno, Melissa Lee, Jonathan Renshon, Atsushi Tago, Margit Tavitz, Carly Wayne, and the attendants at the IR Workshop at Washington University in St. Louis for their helpful comments and suggestions. I acknowledge the support of the Suntory Foundation.

1 Introduction

National leaders have, at times, resorted to large-scale, indiscriminate violence against civilians during inter-state wars. Such atrocities are exemplified by the deployment of weapons of mass destruction and widespread city bombings, with the specter of these tactics still looming globally (Lieber and Press 2023; Schroeder 2023). Insights from the rapidly expanding literature on legacies of violence indicate that individuals' experiences of victimization have varying prolonged effects on attitudes toward in-group and out-group relations (e.g., Balcells 2012; Bauer et al. 2016; Lupu and Peisakhin 2017; Rozenas and Zhukov 2019; Wayne and Zhukov 2022). Meanwhile, exposure to traumatic events in the context of inter-state wars should also reshape individuals' attitudes toward war, as well as their broader views on foreign policy and international relations. Does large-scale violence during past inter-state wars have an enduring influence on foreign policy attitudes?

To address this question, I focus on the long-term impact of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki at the end of World War II, one of the most severe acts of indiscriminate violence against civilians in history. I argue that the atomic bombings have enduring effects on public attitudes toward foreign policy, driving the public toward a dovish direction among contemporary Japanese citizens. The bombings might have fundamentally shifted moral views on war (Dill and Schubiger 2021; Hall, Skoog and Vassiliou 2024; Van de Vyver et al. 2016) and reinforced a preference for international cooperation as a way to prevent future conflict rather than relying on military solutions. These shifted views and preferences, rooted in previous war experiences, may further be transmitted across generations through familial-, community-, and national-level channels. At the familial level, individuals may inherit political views from family members who directly experienced violent events (e.g., Balcells 2012; Lupu and Peisakhin 2017; Wayne and Zhukov 2022). At the community level, institutionalized memories, such as memorials and peace education, play a crucial role in shaping and transmitting these views of the community members (e.g., Charnysh and Peisakhin 2022; Harris 2009; Homola, Pereira and Tavits 2020). Finally, at

the national level, collective memory about violent events can be influential (e.g., Wayne, Damann and Fachter 2023), serving as a potent symbol in narratives on war and foreign relations.

To test the expectations, I conducted an original survey in contemporary Japan with 2,276 respondents, oversampling participants from Hiroshima and Nagasaki prefectures to capture variation in familial and community-level victimization channels. I find that individuals with community-level channels to the atomic bombings, or those who currently reside in Hiroshima or Nagasaki prefectures and those who attended local public schools in these prefectures, are significantly more likely to oppose possessing nuclear weapons, favor international cooperation, and reject the notion that engaging in war can be morally justifiable, compared to those without such channels. Additionally, individuals with familial-level channels who do not reside in the victimized areas also tend to favor dovish foreign policy, though their attitudes slightly differ from those with community-level channels. This difference seems to depict the power of victimized communities in shaping their members' foreign policy attitudes through institutionalized memories.

This study enhances our understanding of how destructive indiscriminate violence during inter-state war, such as atomic bombings, may influence citizens' foreign policy preferences and views on war in the long run. The results of the empirical analyses imply the multi-generational impact of the atomic bombings on public attitudes toward foreign policy. This finding connects to the literature on legacies of political violence (e.g., Balcells 2012; Bauer et al. 2016; Lupu and Peisakhin 2017; Rozenas and Zhukov 2019; Wang 2021; Wayne, Damann and Fachter 2023) by demonstrating that violence in the context of inter-state war could have a long-lasting influence on foreign policy attitudes. It also links to the literature on public attitudes toward foreign policy (e.g., Kertzer and McGraw 2012; Kertzer and Zeitzoff 2017; Rathbun et al. 2016; Tomz, Weeks and Yarhi-Milo 2020), indicating that exposure to wartime violence could leave enduring imprints on foreign policy attitudes of the affected communities and family members.

The findings from this study also contribute to the literature on the intergenerational transmission of political values (Balcells 2012; Charnysh and Peisakhin 2022; Dinas, Fouka and Schläpfer 2021; Homola, Pereira and Tavits 2020; Lupu and Peisakhin 2017; Wayne, Damann and Fachter 2023; Wayne and Zhukov 2022). Previous research emphasizes the role of family and communities in preserving and transmitting the memory of past violence and the lessons drawn from traumatic experiences to future generations. This study highlights the unique strength of communities as a mechanism for transmitting political attitudes across generations, often surpassing the influence of familial channels. This finding suggests the complex interaction between these two pathways in transmitting political attitudes.

Finally, this study has important policy implications for the East Asian security environment. Communities deeply scarred by the trauma of the atomic bombings, which have internalized the moral lessons of past atrocities, tend to favor nonproliferation and multilateral cooperation over military solutions. However, the findings show that these communities do not advocate for a blanket opposition to all forms of military engagement, leaving open the possibility of rising regional tensions. In this context, the dovish constraints imposed by the victimized communities may have limitations.

2 Legacies of Violence and Conflict Attitudes

A myriad of studies have shown that exposure to political violence shapes the political views of individuals. Those who have experienced violence or whose family or community members did, often develop distinct inter-group attitudes. Research shows that such individuals can have negative views towards perpetrators of violence (Balcells 2012; Fouka and Voth 2023; Getmansky and Zeitzoff 2014; Kupatadze and Zeitzoff 2021; Lupu and Peisakhin 2017; Rozenas, Schutte and Zhukov 2017; Rozenas and Zhukov 2019), exhibit increased prosocial behavior (Barceló 2021; Bauer et al. 2016; Dinas, Fouka and Schläpfer 2021; Lindsey and Koos 2024; Wayne and Zhukov 2022), and show decreased social trust (Lee,

Porter and Comfort 2014; Nunn and Wantchekon 2011; Wang 2021). Suffering experiences, more broadly, can also be passed down through generations, prolonging their impact as historical legacies (Acharya, Blackwell and Sen 2016; Balcells 2012; Barceló 2021; Charnysh 2015; Dinas, Fouka and Schläpfer 2021; Fouka and Voth 2023; Homola, Pereira and Tavits 2020; Lupu and Peisakhin 2017; Nunn and Wantchekon 2011; Rozenas, Schutte and Zhukov 2017; Wang 2021; Wayne and Zhukov 2022).

While previous studies have identified legacy effects of political violence on in-group and out-group attitudes, we know relatively little about how such experiences shape long-term beliefs and perceptions of violent events themselves, such as violence, battles, and war. Experiences of devastating violence during inter-state wars may fundamentally shift one's values and opinions about war and use of force in international politics, more broadly.

In this vein, previous studies have examined how exposure to violence influences public opinion on security policy. These studies report mixed findings, indicating that exposure to wartime violence can drive support for both aggressive and non-aggressive policies. On one hand, exposure to violence may harden individuals' attitudes (Grossman, Manekin and Miodownik 2015; Hirsch-Hoefler et al. 2016; Kupatadze and Zeitzoff 2021; Wayne et al. 2024). Such exposure is often strongly associated with heightened threat perceptions, leading to increased support for hawkish policy. For instance, Hirsch-Hoefler et al. (2016) demonstrate that Israelis and Palestinians exposed to violence are less likely to support peace efforts, as these experiences amplify psychological distress and perceptions of threat. Similarly, Kupatadze and Zeitzoff (2021) find that reminders of past Russian aggression among Georgian citizens heightened perceptions of threat from Russia and increased public support for hardline foreign policy stances. Particularly in the context of intractable conflicts, attitudes toward conflict often evolve at the group level, a phenomenon broadly referred to as collective victimhood (Bar-Tal et al. 2009; Noor et al. 2017). This shared perception among group members that their group has been persistently targeted, harmed, or victimized by others can strengthen in-group cohesion and solidarity while simultaneously fostering

hostility toward out-groups perceived as aggressors. Such perceptions may further drive support for hawkish policy (Kljajic, Shelef and vanderWilden 2024).

On the other hand, the pursuit of aggressive policy may not be a popular option among civilians who have been victimized by wartime violence. Experiencing intense violence can lead individuals to question the legitimacy of war, fundamentally reshaping their moral perspectives on it (Dill and Schubiger 2021; Hall, Skoog and Vassiliou 2024; Lazar 2017; Tellez 2019; Van de Vyver et al. 2016). Once one contends war or violence is no longer morally justifiable, such individuals may become reluctant to support aggressive policy. Additionally, the psychological trauma caused by violence can lead to greater risk aversion, as both individuals and communities become keenly aware of the catastrophic consequences of conflict (Blair and Horowitz 2024; Kim 2024*a*;*b*). This effect may be particularly pronounced in cases of exposure to prohibited weapons, such as chemical and nuclear arms, which often forcefully instill the destructiveness of the weapons and induce anxiety (Blair and Horowitz 2024). Direct exposure to violence during conflicts could foster a strong aversion to the recurrence of tragic events, encouraging preferences for non-aggressive policy.

Building on previous works showing that violence exposure can shape individuals' attitudes in either a hawkish or dovish direction, this study addresses two key gaps in understanding the long-term effects of violence. First, although research on historical legacies of political violence has demonstrated that victimization can have lasting impacts, it has primarily concentrated on attitudes toward inter-group conflict and social cohesion. This leaves public attitudes toward foreign policy, a crucial factor in foreign policy-making in democracies (e.g., Tomz 2007; Tomz, Weeks and Yarhi-Milo 2020) and even in non-democracies (e.g., Aksoy, Enamorado and Yang 2024; Weeks 2008), largely unexamined. Second, studies exploring the relationship between conflict exposure and foreign (or security) policy attitudes have predominantly focused on short-term, immediate effects, with limited consideration of their intergenerational persistence.

3 Atomic Bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki

This study examines how one of the most severe acts of violence against civilians in history, the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki at the end of World War II, has shaped long-term foreign policy attitudes among the Japanese public in order to address gaps in our understanding of the enduring effects of wartime violence.

On August 6 and 9, 1945, the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japan became the first and only targets of nuclear bombings in human history. The devastation inflicted by the bombings was unprecedented. In Hiroshima, 90% of the buildings within a three-kilometer radius were obliterated or heavily damaged,[1] while in Nagasaki, 40% of buildings within a four-kilometer radius faced a similar fate.[2] The destruction extended beyond the physical blasts. The destroyed sites were littered with radiation particles, exposing many people to harmful radiation as they searched for missing loved ones amid the rubble. Radioactive fallout also resulted in what came to be known as "black rain," a mix of radioactive particles and debris that fell over vast areas, exposing additional individuals to radiation. The radiation released by the atomic bombs compounded long-term health risks, with effects that persisted across generations. Nearly half of Hiroshima's population of 400,000 and half of Nagasaki's 160,000 citizens had perished by the end of 1945 (Asahi Shimbun 2008), and the number of officially recognized atomic bomb survivors, known as *hibakusha*, reached 370,000 in the late 1970s.[3]

While both cities quickly rebuilt their physical infrastructures in the aftermath of the war (Davis and Weinstein 2002), the psychological and emotional recovery was far slower. Clinical psychology studies emphasize the deep and enduring relationship between war trauma and psychological disorders (e.g., Hobfoll, Canetti-Nisim and Johnson 2006; Johnson and Thompson 2008). These findings are consistent with the experiences of the A-bomb survivors, whose mental health was profoundly shaped by the bombings. The psychological scars of

[1]Hiroshima for Global Peace (Accessed on August 4th 2023)
[2]Nagasaki City (Accessed on August 4th 2023)
[3]Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare (Accessed on August 24, 2024)

the tragedy, documented extensively in historical and psychological research, underscore the bombings' far-reaching effects beyond the immediate destruction (Zwigenberg 2023).

The bombings' unparalleled destructive capacity has also been a subject of significant concern for scholars and policymakers worldwide. Classified as "unconventional" due to their unique ability to cause widespread devastation, they stand as a rare example of revolutionary military technology that has not been widely adopted. This is largely attributed to global non-proliferation efforts, which have led to the establishment of "nuclear taboo" norms (Tannenwald 1999). While scholars have examined public opinion on the nuclear taboo worldwide (e.g., Dill, Sagan and Valentino 2022; Press, Sagan and Valentino 2013) and in Japan (Matsumura, Tago and Grieco 2023), little is known about the consequences of the atomic bombings on civilians' attitudes toward war and foreign policy.

4 Intergenerational Effect of Atomic Bombings on Foreign Policy Attitudes

In this section, I discuss how the atomic bombings may have created intergenerational effects on public attitudes toward war and foreign policy in Japan and outline expectations about which segments of the contemporary Japanese public may continue to be shaped by these events.

Although previous studies report mixed findings, showing that victimization can sometimes increase support for aggressive policies and at other times promote more non-aggressive stances, the case of Japan's atomic bombings presents a clearer pattern toward non-aggressive, dovish orientations. The unprecedented devastation of the atomic bombings, with their immediate blasts and lasting radiation effects, appears to have fundamentally transformed civilians' moral perspectives on war (e.g., Dill and Schubiger 2021; Hall, Skoog and Vassiliou 2024; Lazar 2017; Van de Vyver et al. 2016). Survivors may also have developed greater risk aversion, recognizing the catastrophic consequences of war and inhumane

weapons (Blair and Horowitz 2024; Kim 2024*a*;*b*). As a result, many sought to prevent the recurrence of such catastrophic conflict, turning instead to international cooperation and peace advocacy. This shift is epitomized by *Nihon Hidankyo*, a movement of A-bomb survivors who call for a world free of nuclear weapons, using their profound experiences to underscore the imperative that these weapons must never be deployed again.[4]

With these dovish perspectives emerging from the victimization experiences from the atomic bombings, I argue that subsequent generations of the Japanese public may have inherited these perspectives through familial, community, and national-level channels, leading to *indirect exposure* to the bombings. By *indirect exposure*, I mean the process by which individuals come to understand the bombings and their consequences not through firsthand experience but through these channels.

At the familial level, political views may be passed down from family members who survived traumatic events. This aligns with the literature on the legacy effects of political violence, which emphasizes the family's role in transmitting political values across generations (Balcells 2012; Dinas, Fouka and Schläpfer 2021; Lupu and Peisakhin 2017; Tabellini 2008; Wayne and Zhukov 2022). If the familial role in transmitting views and ideas about foreign policy is significant, individuals with family members who survived or were victimized by the bombings are likely to hold dovish attitudes toward foreign policy.

In practice, the bombings produced a large population of survivors whose experiences left lasting impressions on their families. The children of survivors often grew up with a deep awareness of their ancestors' exposure to radioactive substances and the potential for transgenerational health effects (Asahi Shimbun 2008). This intergenerational anxiety may have shaped the descendants' attitudes toward war and foreign policy.

The community-level channel may also play a significant role in shaping enduring perspectives on foreign policy and war.[5] Communities traumatized by horrific events often

[4]Nobel Prize Press Release, https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/2024/press-release/ (Accessed November 28, 2024).

[5]It is important to note that family and community influences are not mutually exclusive.

make sustained efforts to unite people across generations around a shared identity in pursuit of a renewed social identity (Alexander et al. 2004; Hirschberger 2018; Kahn, Klar and Roccas 2017). These communities can disseminate ideas rooted in past wartime violence by institutionalizing their memories, for example, through memorials, annual ceremonies, and peace education (Canetti et al. 2018; Harris 2009).

If the community-level channel is significant, it could manifest in observable differences in war-related views and foreign policy preferences between members and non-members of traumatized communities. Residents of areas where communities actively preserve and commemorate war memories are likely to develop distinct political attitudes compared to residents in regions without such efforts. One such practice is community-based storytelling practices known as *kataribe katsudo* (Nemoto 2018; Yoneyama 1999), where survivors recounted their experiences to younger generations, ensuring these memories endured (Yoneyama 1999, p.86). Residents of Hiroshima and Nagasaki are frequently exposed to communal activities that emphasize the legacy of past violence and could have daily contact with A-bomb survivors.

Individuals who attended local public schools in Hiroshima or Nagasaki may also exhibit unique political attitudes compared to those who did not. Schools in these regions often incorporate peace education, defined as the "process of teaching people about the threats of violence and strategies for peace" (Harris 2009, p.11). While the content of such education varies greatly depending on the context (Bar-Tal 2002), public schools can serve as critical institutions for transmitting communal views on war and foreign policy, fostering intergenerational continuity in attitudes shaped by the memory of past violence.

In Hiroshima and Nagasaki, public schools are particularly well-known for their focus on peace education (Harris 2009; Ubuki 2014).[6] In the late 1960s, with a new generation

For instance, Tabellini (2008) highlights how parents make purposeful educational choices to transmit cultural values.

[6]A survey in 2021 shows that students from Hiroshima and Nagasaki, as well as Okinawa, receive peace education more frequently than those in other regions of Japan (Nikkei Shimbun; Accessed on March 17, 2014.).

unaware of the bombings, teachers formed the Hiroshima Prefecture A-Bombed Teachers' Association in 1969 (Ubuki 2014, p.268), followed by similar associations in Nagasaki in 1970 (Association to Preserve the Postwar History of the Nagasaki Atomic Bombing 2021, p.309). Working with local education boards, they introduced lessons emphasizing the horrors of nuclear war and advocating for peace (Nemoto 2018, p.140). These community efforts at local public schools may also have transmitted unique dovish foreign policy views to younger generations.

Finally, the national-level channel could serve as a critical factor in shaping and preserving attitudes toward foreign policy rooted in past wartime violence. Traumatic events often evolve into powerful nationwide symbols of identity and nationalism (Anderson 1991). National governments may reinforce these memories, for example, through nationwide history education (Lee and Park 2024; Wang 2008; Wayne, Damann and Fachter 2023). As a result, future generations across the nation may internalize lessons from these events, collectively shaping the foreign policy attitudes of its citizens.

The national-level efforts to commemorate the bombings have been in place for decades in Japan. Since 1971, annual memorial events attended by Japanese Prime Ministers have drawn national attention, and schools often organize visits to memorial museums in Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and Okinawa to educate students on the tragedy of war.[7] The national efforts to preserve and pass down the memory of the atomic bombings are so extensive that citizens' views on war and foreign policy in Hiroshima and Nagasaki may be indistinguishable from those in other regions of Japan. Thus, a lack of differences in public attitudes toward foreign policy between individuals with and without familial and community-level channels would suggest a nationally uniform aftermath effect of the atomic bombings.[8]

[7]Okinawa saw the bloodiest battle in the Pacific, claiming over 120,000 lives—about a quarter of the population. (Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications; Accessed on March 17, 2024)

[8]It is important to recognize that the null findings regarding the effects of familial- and community-level channels cannot distinguish between a nationally uniform effect and the complete absence of any channel effect.

Notably, scholars and foreign policy professionals have traditionally viewed the atomic bombings as targeting both Japan's leaders and its citizens nationwide (Major Derry and Dr. Ramsey to General Groves 1945; Schelling 1966). By the end of 1945, their impact had rapidly spread across the country (The United States Strategic Bombing Survey 1947, p.97), symbolizing Japan's collective suffering during World War II (Berger 1993; Seraphim 2006). Within this context, whether the impact of the bombings on public attitudes is geographically uniform or varies across regions remains an unanswered question, warranting further investigation.

To empirically examine the theoretical claims, I present the following hypotheses:

H_1 (Familial-level): Individuals with atomic bombing survivors in their family are more likely to support dovish foreign policy than those without such familial connections.

H_{2-1} (Community-level 1): Residents of Hiroshima and Nagasaki prefectures are more likely to support dovish foreign policy than residents of other regions.

H_{2-2} (Community-level 2): Individuals who attended public schools in Hiroshima and Nagasaki prefectures are more likely to support dovish foreign policy than those who did not.

5 Empirical Analysis: Evidence from Original Survey in Contemporary Japan

To quantitatively assess the hypotheses, I conducted a preregistered online survey in Japan. The survey was fielded between July 4 and 9, 2024,[9] using the online survey platform Cross Marketing Research.[10] To ensure variation in the measures of channels to the atomic bombings, I oversampled respondents from Hiroshima and Nagasaki. This

[9]The study received IRB approval from Washington University in St. Louis (ID 202405110) and was preregistered with OSF: `https://osf.io/9adux/?view_only=fd73b8eb99694f9f88415b1dd170dd70`

[10]https://www.cm-group.co.jp/en/

resulted in a total of 2,276 respondents, comprising 777 from Hiroshima prefecture, 710 from Nagasaki prefecture, and 789 from other regions of Japan, excluding Okinawa prefecture.[11] The respondent demographics are balanced in terms of gender and age, and none of them had direct exposure to the atomic bombings. The survey consists of both observational and experimental components.[12]

Data

Explanatory Variable

I operationalize the channels through which individuals have indirect exposure to the atomic bombings with three variables. `Family` indicates whether an individual has a family member who was a survivor or victim of the atomic bombings. `Current Residents` denotes whether a respondent currently resides in Hiroshima or Nagasaki Prefecture. `Public School Attendants` represents whether a respondent attended public elementary or junior high school in Hiroshima or Nagasaki Prefecture.[13] The questionnaires assessing whether one has A-bomb survivors/victims as a family member and went to public school in Hiroshima or Nagasaki were placed after the questions on the dependent variables to prevent priming effects among respondents to adopt the perspectives of survivors by earlier questions (e.g., Williamson et al. 2021).

I consider Hiroshima and Nagasaki prefectures to serve as local communities that suffer from the historical trauma of the bombings. Prefectures are Japan's primary administrative

[11] I excluded Okinawa due to the unique circumstances, experiencing prolonged U.S. occupation between 1945 and 1972 and still hosting a significant proportion of U.S. military facilities within Japan (Hikotani, Horiuchi and Tago 2023).

[12] In the experimental study, I prime respondents to recall the atomic bombings during World War II to investigate how foreign policy support differs among respondents with and without channels. Respondents were presented with a vignette describing Japan's current defense policy and were randomly assigned reminders of the atomic bombings. I discuss and report the results of the experimental study in the later section of this paper and in Appendix.

[13] Compulsory education in Japan covers these levels.

units, with stable borders since 1893 and some autonomy over public policy, including teacher hiring and educational guidelines for public schools.[14] Memberships of the National Council of Japan Nuclear Free Local Authorities,[15] composed of municipalities (sub-level administrative units of prefectures) opposing nuclear weapons, show a striking geographic pattern. Hiroshima and Nagasaki prefectures have the highest membership rates, about 80% and 90% of their municipalities respectively, far exceeding those of other prefectures.[16] This sharp divergence highlights that the legacy of victimization is preserved and expressed at the prefectural level, justifying the use of prefectures as the key community unit in this study.



Figure 1: Survey Respondents with Familial and Community-level Channels to Atomic Bombings

Notes: The figure shows the distribution of respondents' channels to the atomic bombings for the National, Hiroshima, and Nagasaki samples.

The distribution of respondents' channels to the atomic bombings is displayed in Figure 1. As anticipated, respondents with channels are concentrated in Hiroshima and Nagasaki prefectures, with significant overlap between familial and community-level channels.

[14]Japan consists of 47 prefectures, each functioning as a distinct administrative region.

[15]http://www.nucfreejapan.com/ (Accessed on March 28, 2024)

[16]The next-highest prefectures, Miyagi, Okinawa, and Toyama, had membership rates of 46%, 41%, and 40% respectively.

Dependent Variables

Primary dependent variables are support for four specific foreign policy items and three composite indices on foreign policy orientations. The first two variables are `Strengthen Defense Capabilities` and `Increase Defense Spending`. The former measures support for enhancing Japan's military capabilities, while the latter captures support for boosting defense expenditures. A more dovish stance is thus indicated by lower support for both expanding military capabilities and increasing defense budgets (Mearsheimer 2001; Waltz 1979). The third variable is `Possess Nuclear Weapons`, capturing the level of support for whether the national government of Japan should possess nuclear weapons. This policy may gain significantly less support from those with channels than the other variables as it could be a natural reaction to the traumatic experiences. The fourth variable is `Revise Constitution Article 9`. Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, which formally renounces war and restricts Japan's remilitarization, is deeply intertwined with the hawkish-dovish dimension in Japanese politics. Conservatives, or hawks, often criticize Article 9 for its idealistic assumptions about world peace and its constraints on Japan's Self-Defense Forces (SDF). Conversely, the preservation of Article 9 is often supported by leftists, or doves, emphasizing non-militarization (e.g., Katzenstein and Okawara 1993). These four variables are each measured on a 7-point Likert scale.

Regarding one's foreign policy orientations, I gauge scores for `Militant Internationalism (MI)`, `Cooperative Internationalism (CI)`, and `Isolationism` following Rathbun et al. (2016), who revised items originally developed by Wittkopf (1990). These concepts align with established literature on foreign policy views in the U.S. (Maggiotto and Wittkopf 1981; Wittkopf 1990), where `MI` captures a preference for deploying troops abroad to achieve foreign policy goals, `CI` reflects a tendency to build cooperative relationships with other nations and oppose *realpolitik* principles, and `isolationism` indicates the desired level of involvement in foreign affairs (Maggiotto and Wittkopf 1981). For this study's purpose, I refined the items so that they fit the context of

Japan.[17] To construct each index, I added up the corresponding items.

Additionally, I asked questions to explore potential mechanisms driving the associations between the victimization from atomic bombings and foreign policy preferences. For this purpose, I create a variable `Moral Views`, which measures the degree to which one believes fighting wars can be morally justified depending on the objectives.[18] If this variable correlates negatively with the channel variables, it implies that the atomic bombings have prompted a change in moral views about war.

Model

I estimate the following OLS model with robust standard errors:

$$y_i = \tau_1 \text{Channel}_i + \gamma \mathbf{X_i} + \epsilon_i.$$

where y_i denotes dependent variables, Channel_i indicates the primary explanatory variables for individual i. These are `Family`, `Current Residents`, and `Public School Attendants`. $\mathbf{X_i}$ is a matrix for covariates, such as ideology, age, sex, education, income, and fixed effects for the vignette status to account for the variation emanating from the manipulation of the vignette.[19] Since I estimate the results separately for the three main explanatory variables, I run 21 models in total. To address multiple testing concerns (e.g., Liu and Shiraito 2023), I use the Benjamini-Hochberg method (Benjamini and Hochberg 1995) to adjust the p-values.

[17] The only changes I made were to change the country name "United States" to "Japan."

[18] Concretely, I asked whether one agrees with the statement *"it can be morally justifiable to enter war depending on the objective."* This item is measured on a 1-5 Likert scale.

[19] See Appendix D for the details of the information I provided to respondents. I will also briefly report the findings from this manipulation in the following section.

6 Results

Figure 2 displays the relationships between the channels and support for specific foreign policy measures. The figure contains four panels for each policy support variable, reporting the estimates for the three indicator variables for channels: `Family`, `Current Residents`, and `Public School Attendants`. The points and bars indicate coefficients and 95% confidence intervals, and the numbers in the plots denote the adjusted p-values using the Benjamini-Hochberg method.[20]



Figure 2: Channels to the A-bombs and Policy Support
Notes: The figure shows coefficient estimates, 95% confidence intervals with robust standard errors, and adjusted p-values. The estimates are obtained from separate models incorporating covariates.

Figure 2 shows that the channels through which one is indirectly exposed to the atomic

[20]I apply the p-value adjustment to the estimates for all primary outcomes, four policy support and three foreign policy view variables, as specified in the pre-analysis plan.

bombings, regardless of how one measures it, do not have a significant effect on support for defense policy, defense spending, and the revision of Article 9 of the Constitution. More notable findings from Figure 2 are that `Current Residents` and `Public School Attendants` are significantly less likely to support the Japanese government's possession of nuclear weapons. The effect size is non-negligible: individuals are 5.49% less likely to support the policy if they currently live in Hiroshima or Nagasaki prefecture and 6.36% less likely if they attended public elementary or junior high school. This finding underlines the role of the community-level channel in shaping opposition to nuclear weapons.



Figure 3: Channels to the A-bombs and Foreign Policy Views
Notes: The figure shows coefficient estimates, 95% confidence intervals with robust standard errors, and adjusted p-values. The estimates are obtained from separate models incorporating covariates.

Figure 3 shows how each channel relates to foreign policy views. Although neither `MI` nor `Isolationism` is significantly affected, `Public School Attendants` display a clear preference for `CI`. This finding suggests that individuals socialized within these historically victimized communities are more inclined toward international cooperation rather than a military power-centric, *realpolitik* principle. The community-level socialization processes

linked to the bombings continue to shape foreign policy perspectives in a more dovish, cooperative direction.



Figure 4: Channels to the A-bombs and Moral Views about War
Notes: The figure shows coefficient estimates, 95% confidence intervals with robust standard errors, and adjusted p-values. The estimates are obtained from separate models incorporating covariates.

In order to understand why individuals with indirect exposure to the atomic bombings tend to support dovish foreign policy, Figure 4 presents the results on the key exploratory dependent variable, `Moral Views`.[21] The figure indicates that those with community-level channels (i.e., `Current Residents` and `Public School Attendants`) significantly oppose the statement that war is morally justifiable compared to those who do not have such channels. This supports the explanation that the atomic bombings led to a fundamental shift in moral values about war, and these ideas were transmitted to individuals through community-level channels. Since the shift is not observable for individuals with the familial-level channel, this narrative would have been transmitted through community-level socialization efforts.

[21]Following the pre-analysis plan, I apply p-value adjustments to the estimates for all six exploratory variables to reduce the risk of false positives.

To ensure the robustness of the findings, I ran additional models with alternative specifications and performed sensitivity analyses. The results overall confirm that the findings remain robust. See Appendix C for details on the robustness checks.

As noted in the previous section, this survey incorporates the randomization of vignettes. In the survey, respondents were randomly presented with vignettes reminding them of the atomic bombings, along with information about the augmentation of Japan's defensive capabilities. This was designed to enhance awareness of the bombings, as previous studies suggest that the legacy effects of past tragedies may only become salient under specific circumstances (e.g., Canetti et al. 2018; Fouka and Voth 2023).

The results are broadly consistent with those from the observational study. Regarding attitudes toward nuclear weapons, individuals with community-level channels hold significantly negative opinions, even without reminders about the atomic bombings (Table D.1). For cooperative internationalism, individuals with community-level channels are significantly more likely to adopt such a stance (Figure D.1). However, the observed treatment effect was not substantially large, possibly for several reasons. First, individuals with any ties to the bombings likely experienced strong pre-treatment contamination, having been exposed to information on the atomic bombings many times and limiting the impact of the reminder on their opinions. Alternatively, the control group's vignette on fluctuations in the security environment in East Asia and the response by the government to increase defense spending may have evoked thoughts of the atomic bombings. See Appendix D for details.

Drivers of Intergenerational Transmission of Foreign Policy Attitudes

While the regression analyses suggest that community-level channels of indirect exposure to the atomic bombings foster support for dovish foreign policy, it remains unclear what each channel variable specifically captures and how they differ from one another. If each channel variable genuinely reflects higher indirect exposure to the bombings, it should

strongly correlate with knowledge and behaviors tied to the collective memory of the atomic bombings in distinctive ways. To confirm this, I regress each channel variable, as well as three placebo dummy variables, on various outcomes related to the bombings. The placebo variables I examine are `Migrants`, which indicates whether an individual migrated to Hiroshima or Nagasaki; `Non-Public School Attendants`, which represents whether an individual attended a non-public school in these prefectures; and `Air-raids Victims in Family`, which denotes whether one had family members affected by air-raids other than the atomic bombings (Harada, Ito and Smith 2024).

The outcome variables linked to the bombings are the proportion of correct answers to four quiz questions about the bombings (`Quiz`),[22] dummy variables indicating whether respondents have ever read *Hadashi-no-Gen* (`Read Gen`),[23] visited a memorial museum in Hiroshima or Nagasaki (`Museum`), attended annual ceremony in Hiroshima or Nagasaki (`Ceremony`), and whether one have discussed the atomic bombings with one's family (`Discuss`). The models include the same controls as before.

Figure 5 presents the results.[24] As expected, individuals with either familial or community-level connections to the bombings exhibit significantly greater knowledge and experiences related to the atomic bombings than those without such connections. Notable differences also emerge between the two groups. Individuals with community-level connections score significantly higher on the quiz and have more intensive exposure to the memories of suffering, particularly through reading *Hadashi-no-Gen* and visiting museums. In contrast, those with familial-level connections are just as likely as, or even more likely than,

[22]Respondents were asked about the exact time and the name of the aircraft that dropped the bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

[23]*Hadashi-no-Gen* (Barefoot Gen) is a historical manga by Keiji Nakazawa that depicts life in Hiroshima after the bombing, based on Nakazawa's own experiences. The author hoped that *Hadashi-no-Gen* would teach younger generations about the horror of war and atomic bombings (Nakazawa 2008, p.47). The manga has been widely used in peace education despite its sometimes frighteningly realistic depictions (Ogawa 2021).

[24]After applying p-value adjustments, results that were significant at the 5% level remain significant at the same level.



Figure 5: Channels to the A-bombs and the A-bombs Linked Outcomes
Notes: The figure shows coefficient estimates, 95% confidence intervals with robust standard errors.

those with community-level connections to participate in annual ceremonies and discuss the atomic bombings with family members.

Among the placebo variables, migrants to Hiroshima or Nagasaki are indistinguishable from others. Non-public school attendees in these prefectures are more likely to participate in ceremonies or discuss the bombings with family members but do not differ significantly from other Japanese citizens in other respects. Individuals with family members who suffered from conventional air raids (excluding the atomic bombings) exhibit somewhat higher knowledge and engagement. However, they perform worse on the quiz and are less likely to be exposed to memories of suffering compared to those with community-level channels.

This empirical exploration demonstrates that the channel variables meaningfully predict differences in knowledge and behavior in different ways. Specifically, individuals with community-level connections exhibit greater knowledge about the bombings and are more

frequently exposed to related materials compared to those without such connections. This evidence highlights the role of these communities in shaping distinctive views on war and foreign policy.

Interaction Effect of Familial and Community-level Channels

Finally, skeptical readers may be concerned that an overlap between familial-level and community-level channels, as illustrated in Figure 1, may be obscuring the standalone effect of the familial-level channel without access to the community-level channel. To disentangle the familial and community-level channels' independent effects, I regressed each outcome variable on a categorical variable comprising four distinct levels derived from the combination of `Family` and `Current Residents`.[25]

While the observed pattern remains consistent for those residing in Hiroshima and Nagasaki prefectures, the results show a unique pattern among those who have family members but do not live in the regions. Such individuals exhibit significantly lower support for strengthening defense capabilities and increasing defense spending, and their support for nuclear weapon possession is comparable to that of individuals without any direct channels to the atomic bombings (Table E.1). These respondents are also generally supporters of neither militant internationalism, cooperative internationalism, nor isolationism, reflecting a general reluctance toward international engagement while simultaneously opposing egoistic foreign policy stances (Table E.1). Furthermore, they do not possess strong views against the idea of war being morally wrong (Table E.2).

This difference between those with and without connections to the victimized communities among those who have family members may reflect the capacity of victimized communities in Hiroshima and Nagasaki in shaping and monopolizing narratives about war and foreign policy among their constituents. To examine this possibility, I further analyzed their attitudes toward the U.S., the perpetrator of the bombings and Japan's most important

[25]Note that I could not explore triple interaction effects among `Family`, `Public School Attendants`, and `Current Residents` due to sample size constraints.

ally today, using two measures: 1) whether one thinks the U.S. would help Japan if Japan were in a state of conflict with another country and 2) the U.S. is a trustworthy country for Japan. The results consistently show that individuals with family ties to the bombings but who live outside Hiroshima and Nagasaki hold significantly negative views on these two items, whereas others, including those with family members who currently reside in Hiroshima or Nagasaki, do not exhibit such negative perceptions (Table E.3). Notably, negative views toward past perpetrators are also observed among those with family members affected by conventional air-raids (Table E.3), aligning with previous findings in the literature (e.g., Fouka and Voth 2023; Kupatadze and Zeitzoff 2021). These distinctions hint that local communities play a key role in shaping narratives that override personal experiences.

Overall, I find robust evidence for the community-level channel hypotheses (H_{2-1} and H_{2-2}) that those with community-level channels tend to be dove, opposing nuclear weapon possession and supporting cooperative internationalism. This pattern appears to be linked to a shift in moral values concerning war, supporting the argument that victimization from large-scale wartime violence alters views on conflict. The supplemental analyses on the interaction effect of `Family` and `Current Residents` further reveal that the familial-level channel can also pass down political attitudes, partially supporting the familial-level channel hypothesis (H_1). Nevertheless, it also highlights the complex dynamic in which community-level channels can exert a stronger influence than familial-level connections.

7 Discussion

The devastating impact of the atomic bombings on Japan, despite the central role these events have played in international politics for decades, has seldom been examined through a quantitative lens. This research takes a stab at doing so, specifically focusing on their long-term effects on civilians' attitudes toward foreign policy. The original survey data from contemporary Japan revealed complex but intriguing empirical patterns, offering important

implications and raising new questions.

Empirical analyses indicate that atomic bombing victimization leaves an enduring mark on foreign policy attitudes. In the case of the atomic bombings, individuals indirectly exposed to the violence through familial or community channels tend to be more dovish, even amid nationwide efforts to preserve and pass down these memories, echoing research on how traumatic violence imprints persistent conflict aversion (Blair and Horowitz 2024; Canetti et al. 2018; Grossman, Manekin and Miodownik 2015; Kim 2024*a*;*b*). These findings reinforce studies on the generational durability of war legacies, where traumatic experiences can affect subsequent cohorts (e.g., Balcells 2012; Bauer et al. 2016; Lupu and Peisakhin 2017; Rozenas and Zhukov 2019; Wang 2021; Wayne, Damann and Fachter 2023) and have implications for the literature on public opinion toward foreign policy (e.g., Kertzer et al. 2014; Kertzer and Zeitzoff 2017; Rathbun et al. 2016; Tomz, Weeks and Yarhi-Milo 2020), which has predominantly focused on the U.S., that countries with experiences in battles on their own soil may harbor distinct public sentiments about foreign policy. While the case of the atomic bombings demonstrates long-lasting dovish effects, future research is needed to assess whether other instances of violence during inter-state wars produce similar enduring impacts on foreign policy attitudes and what factors shape their direction.

Although both familial and community-level victimization channels promote dovish attitudes, I find that each channel influences somewhat different elements of foreign policy attitudes. The community-level channel yields stronger opposition to nuclear weapons, a firm moral repudiation of war, and a preference for international cooperation. By contrast, individuals exposed to the atomic bombings only through familial channels are reluctant to bolster national defense and reject extreme positions, such as militant, cooperative, and isolationist stances. Where both forms of channels coexist, the community-level collective norms and commemorations seem to override family-level narratives. Given this intricate interaction between familial and community-level channels, future research should treat them separately rather than collapsing them into a single "victimization" category.

The strength of the community-level channel over the familial-level channel may reflect the success of institutionalization of the suffering memories. According to the insights from social psychology, collective trauma can compel communities to forge a renewed social identity by uniting people across generations around a shared history (Alexander et al. 2004; Hirschberger 2018; Kahn, Klar and Roccas 2017). In Hiroshima and Nagasaki, this process fostered distinctive local norms concerning war, disseminated via institutional means such as memorials, monuments, and peace education at local public schools. An anthropologist, Lisa Yoneyama, refers to these distinctive norms as "nuclear universalism," a framework that interprets the atomic bombings through "natural and commonly shared human thoughts, sentiments, and moral attitudes that transcend cultural boundaries" (Yoneyama 1999, p.15). In line with this outlook, interviews with 548 survivors by the Asahi Shimbun, Japan's largest liberal-leaning newspaper, found that 87% strongly desired to prevent future nuclear wars (Asahi Shimbun 2008, p.272). One survivor declared, "it's enough that we had to bear this tragedy," underscoring the hope that no one else would ever face such horrors (Asahi Shimbun 2008, p.271). Together, survivors' psychological suffering and institutionalized community efforts help explain why community-level influence remains so resilient. This also aligns with works on the effect of memorial institutions, such as museums (e.g., Balcells, Palanza and Voytas 2022) and history education (e.g., Lee and Park 2024; Wang 2008; Wayne, Damann and Fachter 2023), in influencing civilians' political attitudes.

An important question, then, is who shapes these shared narratives and norms within victimized communities. One notable factor lies in the local postwar political landscape. In Hiroshima and Nagasaki, for example, peace education was facilitated by collaboration between the A-Bombed Teachers' Association and local boards of education (Bar-Tal 2002; Ubuki 2014), but teachers did not enjoy complete autonomy over curricular content. Conservative politicians and education officials in Nagasaki, for example, resisted classes centered on personal testimonies of the bombings, concerned that such content would encourage students to critically scrutinize Japan's historical role and contemporary security

challenges (Association to Preserve the Postwar History of the Nagasaki Atomic Bombing 2021, p.311). Ultimately, peace education in Nagasaki prioritized documenting local damage, organizing memorial events, and passing down experiences through students' families (Ubuki 2014, p.268), thus reinforcing a consensus around nuclear disarmament and war aversion.

As the case of local peace education illustrates, political influence may have shaped the content of local narratives and norms, fostering a cross-partisan consensus around themes such as nuclear disarmament and war aversion. This account is also consistent with the findings that individuals with both familial and community-level channels do not hold negative perceptions of the U.S., the perpetrator of the bombings and a key strategic partner of Japan from the conservatives' standpoint, whereas those with victimized family members but without community ties remain distrustful toward the U.S. In an alternative scenario where communists or socialists wielded greater political influence in these regions, we might have observed even stronger dovish preferences and anti-U.S. attitudes among those embedded in the local community. Such counterfactuals emphasize the important yet often subtle role political dynamics play in shaping collective memories.

This study also carries significant policy implications for the East Asian security environment. The empirical analysis reveals that individuals connected to communities profoundly affected by the atomic bombings largely favor nonproliferation and multilateral diplomacy over military solutions. However, even these "dovish" communities, which represent a much larger segment of the population than those with purely familial-level exposure, can still support strengthened defense capabilities. This suggests that moral aversion to large-scale conflict stemming from the atomic bombings does not necessarily translate into outright pacifism. In the East Asia region, characterized by territorial disputes, missile development, and intricate alliance politics, such a stance leaves room for rising military tensions. Thus, while the atomic bombings are often viewed as symbols of Japan's anti-militarist culture (e.g., Berger 1993; Seraphim 2006), the constraints on militarization are not absolute, reflecting the nuanced and evolving nature of Japanese public opinion that

could constrain the country's strategic security policy.

Admittedly, this study confronts several limitations. Because of its observational design, establishing definitive causality remains challenging. Factors such as self-selection into public schools, local political cultures, and other unobserved variables may confound the relationship between channel variables and attitudes. Future research should, therefore, employ more rigorous identification strategies to investigate the causal impact of victimization on foreign policy preferences. In addition, limited sample sizes made it difficult to distinguish second and third-generation survivors. Distinguishing differing generations would greatly clarify how extreme historical events reverberate through societies, shaping attitudes for a prolonged period.

References

Acharya, Avidit, Matthew Blackwell and Maya Sen. 2016. "The Political Legacy of American Slavery." *The Journal of Politics* 78(3):621–641.

Aksoy, Deniz, Ted Enamorado and Tony Zirui Yang. 2024. "Russian Invasion of Ukraine and Chinese Public Support for War." *International Organization* pp. 1–20.

Alexander, Jeffrey C, Ron Eyerman, Bernard Giesen, Neil J. Smelser and Piotr Sztompka. 2004. Toward a Theory of Cultural Trauma. In *Cultural Trauma and Collective Identity*. University of California Press pp. 1–30.

Anderson, Benedict. 1991. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London: Verso.

Asahi Shimbun, ed. 2008. *Testimony of 500 Atomic Bomb Survivors [in Japanese]*.

Association to Preserve the Postwar History of the Nagasaki Atomic Bombing, ed. 2021. *75 Years After the Bomb: Tracing Nagasaki's Memories and Records [in Japanese]*. shositsukumo.

Balcells, Laia. 2012. "The Consequences of Victimization on Political Identities: Evidence from Spain." *Politics & Society* 40(3):311–347.

Balcells, Laia, Valeria Palanza and Elsa Voytas. 2022. "Do Transitional Justice Museums Persuade Visitors? Evidence from a Field Experiment." *The Journal of Politics* 84(1):496–510.

Bar-Tal, Daniel. 2002. The Elusive Nature of Peace Education. In *Peace Education: The Concept, Principles, and Practices Around the World*, ed. Gavriel Salomon and Baruch Nevo. pp. 27–36.

Bar-Tal, Daniel, Lily Chernyak-Hai, Noa Schori and Ayelet Gundar. 2009. "A Sense of Self-perceived Collective Victimhood in Intractable Conflicts." *International Review of the Red Cross* 91(874):229–258.

Barceló, Joan. 2021. "The Long-term Effects of War Exposure on Civic Engagement." *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 118(6).

Bauer, Michal, Christopher Blattman, Julie Chytilová, Joseph Henrich, Edward Miguel and Tamar Mitts. 2016. "Can War Foster Cooperation?" *The Journal of Economic Perspectives* 30(3):249–274.

Benjamini, Yoav and Yosef Hochberg. 1995. "Controlling the False Discovery Rate: A Practical and Powerful Approach to Multiple Testing." *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series B: Statistical Methodology* 57(1):289–300.

Berger, Thomas. 1993. "From Sword to Chrysanthemum: Japan's Culture of Anti-militarism." *International Security* 17(4):119.

Blair, Christopher and Michael Horowitz. 2024. "Military Attitudes on the Chemical Weapons Taboo: Evidence from the Pacific Theater." *The Journal of Politics* 86(3):1075–1082.

Canetti, Daphna, Gilad Hirschberger, Carmit Rapaport, Julia Elad-Strenger, Tsachi Ein-Dor, Shifra Rosenzveig, Tom Pyszczynski and Stevan E. Hobfoll. 2018. "Collective Trauma From the Lab to the Real World: The Effects of the Holocaust on Contemporary Israeli Political Cognitions." *Political Psychology* 39(1):3–21.

Charnysh, Volha. 2015. "Historical Legacies of Interethnic Competition: Anti-Semitism and the EU Referendum in Poland." *Comparative Political Studies* 48(13):1711–1745.

Charnysh, Volha and Leonid Peisakhin. 2022. "The Role of Communities in the Transmission

of Political Values: Evidence from Forced Population Transfers." *British Journal of Political Science* 52(1):238–258.

Davis, Donald and David Weinstein. 2002. "Bones, Bombs, and Break Points: The Geography of Economic Activity." *American Economic Review* 92(5).

Dill, Janina and Livia Schubiger. 2021. "Attitudes toward the Use of Force: Instrumental Imperatives, Moral Principles, and International Law." *American Journal of Political Science* 65(3):612–633.

Dill, Janina, Scott Sagan and Benjamin Valentino. 2022. "Kettles of Hawks: Public Opinion on the Nuclear Taboo and Noncombatant Immunity in the United States, United Kingdom, France, and Israel." *Security Studies* 31(1):1–31.

Dinas, Elias, Vasiliki Fouka and Alain Schläpfer. 2021. "Family History and Attitudes toward Out-Groups: Evidence from the European Refugee Crisis." *The Journal of Politics* 83(2):647–661.

Fouka, Vasiliki and Hans-Joachim Voth. 2023. "Collective Remembrance and Private Choice: German–Greek Conflict and Behavior in Times of Crisis." *American Political Science Review* 117(3):851–870.

Getmansky, Anna and Thomas Zeitzoff. 2014. "Terrorism and Voting: The Effect of Rocket Threat on Voting in Israeli Elections." *American Political Science Review* 108(3):588–604.

Grossman, Guy, Devorah Manekin and Dan Miodownik. 2015. "The Political Legacies of Combat: Attitudes Toward War and Peace Among Israeli Ex-Combatants." *International Organization* 69(4):981–1009.

Hall, Jonathan, Eric Skoog and Phaidon Vassiliou. 2024. "The Impact of War Exposure on Morality: Evidence From the Battle of Mosul." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 68(7-8):1468–1493.

Harada, Masataka, Gaku Ito and Daniel Smith. 2024. "Destruction from Above: Long-Term Legacies of the Tokyo Air Raids." *The Journal of Politics* 86(2):782–797.

Harris, Ian. 2009. History of Peace Education. In *Handbook on Peace Education*, ed. Gavriel Salomon and Ed Cairns. Taylor & Francis Group pp. 11–20.

Hikotani, Takako, Yusaku Horiuchi and Atsushi Tago. 2023. "Revisiting negative externalities of US military bases: the case of Okinawa." *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 23(2):325–349.

Hirsch-Hoefler, Sivan, Daphna Canetti, Carmit Rapaport and Stevan E. Hobfoll. 2016. "Conflict will Harden your Heart: Exposure to Violence, Psychological Distress, and Peace Barriers in Israel and Palestine." *British Journal of Political Science* 46(4):845–859.

Hirschberger, Gilad. 2018. "Collective Trauma and the Social Construction of Meaning." *Frontiers in Psychology* 9:1441.

Hobfoll, Stevan, Daphna Canetti-Nisim and Robert Johnson. 2006. "Exposure to Terrorism, Stress-related Mental Health Symptoms, and Defensive Coping among Jews and Arabs in Israel." *Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology* 74:207–218.

Homola, Jonathan, Miguel Pereira and Margit Tavits. 2020. "Legacies of the Third Reich: Concentration Camps and Out-group Intolerance." *American Political Science Review* 114(2):573–590.

Johnson, Howard and Andrew Thompson. 2008. "The Development and Maintenance of Post-traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) in Civilian Adult Survivors of War Trauma and Torture: A Review." *Clinical Psychology Review* 28(1):36–47.

Kahn, Dennis, Yechiel Klar and Sonia Roccas. 2017. "For the Sake of the Eternal Group: Perceiving the Group as Trans-Generational and Endurance of Ingroup Suffering." *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 43(2):272–283.

Katzenstein, Peter and Nobuo Okawara. 1993. "Japan's National Security: Structures, Norms, and Policies." *International Security* 17(4):84.

Kertzer, Joshua and Kathleen McGraw. 2012. "Folk Realism: Testing the Microfoundations of Realism in Ordinary Citizens1: Folk Realism." *International Studies Quarterly* 56(2):245–258.

Kertzer, Joshua, Kathleen Powers, Brian Rathbun and Ravi Iyer. 2014. "Moral Support: How Moral Values Shape Foreign Policy Attitudes." *The Journal of Politics* 76(3):825–840.

Kertzer, Joshua and Thomas Zeitzoff. 2017. "A Bottom-Up Theory of Public Opinion about Foreign Policy." *American Journal of Political Science* 61(3):543–558.

Kim, James. 2024*a*. "Fear or Anger? Leaders' Childhood War Trauma and Interstate Conflict Initiation." *International Studies Quarterly* 68(2):sqae069.

Kim, James. 2024*b*. "The Long-run Impact of Childhood Wartime Violence on Preferences for Nuclear Proliferation." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 68(1):108–137.

Kljajic, Marko, Nadav Shelef and Ethan vanderWilden. 2024. "Collective Victimhood and Conflict-related Attitudes: A Meta-analysis.".

Kupatadze, Alexander and Thomas Zeitzoff. 2021. "In the Shadow of Conflict: How Emotions, Threat Perceptions and Victimization Influence Foreign Policy Attitudes." *British Journal of Political Science* 51(1):181–202.

Lazar, Seth. 2017. "Just War Theory: Revisionists Versus Traditionalists." *Annual Review of Political Science* 20(1):37–54.

Lee, Hedwig, Lauren C. Porter and Megan Comfort. 2014. "Consequences of Family Member Incarceration: Impacts on Civic Participation and Perceptions of the Legitimacy and Fairness of Government." *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 651(1):44–73.

Lee, Soyoung and Jeongmin Park. 2024. "Teaching Hate? The Effect of School History Education on Foreign Policy Attitudes." *SSRN Electronic Journal* .

Lieber, Keir and Daryl Press. 2023. "Return of Nuclear Escalation: How America's Adversaries Have Hijacked Its Old Deterrence Strategy." *Foreign Affairs* 102:45–55.

Lindsey, Summer and Carlo Koos. 2024. "Legacies of Wartime Sexual Violence: Survivors, Psychological Harms, and Mobilization." *American Political Science Review* pp. 1–17.

Liu, Guoer and Yuki Shiraito. 2023. "Multiple Hypothesis Testing in Conjoint Analysis." *Political Analysis* 31(3):380–395.

Lupu, Noam and Leonid Peisakhin. 2017. "The Legacy of Political Violence across Generations." *American Journal of Political Science* 61(4):836–851.

Maggiotto, Michael and Eugene Wittkopf. 1981. "American Public Attitudes toward Foreign Policy." *International Studies Quarterly* 25:601–631.

Major Derry and Dr. Ramsey to General Groves. 1945. "Summary of Target Committee Meetings on 10 and 11 May, 1945." *RG 77, MED Records, Top Secret Documents, File no. 5d* .

Matsumura, Naoko, Atsushi Tago and Joseph Grieco. 2023. "External Threats and Public Opinion: The East Asian Security Environment and Japanese Views on the Nuclear Option." *Journal of East Asian Studies* 23:23–44.

Mearsheimer, John J. 2001. *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. W. W. Norton & Company.

Nakazawa, Keiji. 2008. *Hadashi-no-gen wa Hiroshima wo Wasurenai [Hadash-no-Gen Do Not Forget Hiroshima]*. Iwanami Shoten, Publishers.

Nemoto, Masaya. 2018. *Hiroshima Paradox: Sengo Nihon no Hannkaku to Jindou Ishiki [Hiroshima Paradox: Anti-Nuclear and Humanitarian Awareness in Postwar Japan]*. Bensei Publishing.

Noor, Masi, Johanna Ray Vollhardt, Silvia Mari and Arie Nadler. 2017. "The Social Psychology of Collective Victimhood." *European Journal of Social Psychology* 47(2):121–134.

Nunn, Nathan and Leonard Wantchekon. 2011. "The Slave Trade and the Origins of Mistrust in Africa." *American Economic Review* 101(7):3221–3252.

Ogawa, Hideo. 2021. "Education for Peace in Hiroshima: Particularities and Difficulties — An Analysis of Materials for Peace Education Created by the Teachers' Union [in Japanese]." *Bulletin of the Graduate School of Education, Hiroshima University* 2:529–538.

Press, Daryl, Scott Sagan and Benjamin Valentino. 2013. "Atomic Aversion: Experimental Evidence on Taboos, Traditions, and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons." *American Political Science Review* 107(1):188–206.

Rathbun, Brian C., Joshua D. Kertzer, Jason Reifler, Paul Goren and Thomas J. Scotto. 2016. "Taking Foreign Policy Personally: Personal Values and Foreign Policy Attitudes." *International Studies Quarterly* 60(1):124–137.

Rozenas, Arturas, Sebastian Schutte and Yuri Zhukov. 2017. "The Political Legacy of Violence: The Long-Term Impact of Stalin's Repression in Ukraine." *The Journal of Politics* 79(4):1147–1161.

Rozenas, Arturas and Yuri Zhukov. 2019. "Mass Repression and Political Loyalty: Evidence from Stalin's 'Terror by Hunger'." *American Political Science Review* 113(2):569–583.

Schelling, C. Thomas. 1966. *Arms and Influence.* Yale University Press.

Schroeder, Peter. 2023. "The Real Russian Nuclear Threat.".

Seraphim, Franziska. 2006. *War Memory and Social Politics in Japan, 1945–2005.*

Tabellini, Guido. 2008. "The Scope of Cooperation: Values and Incentives." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 123(3):905–950.

Tannenwald, Nina. 1999. "The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Normative Basis of Nuclear Non-Use." *International Organization* 53(3):433–468.

Tellez, Juan Fernando. 2019. "Worlds Apart: Conflict Exposure and Preferences for Peace." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 63(4):1053–1076.

The United States Strategic Bombing Survey. 1947. "The Effects of Strategic Bombing on Japanese Morale.".

Tomz, Michael. 2007. "Domestic Audience Costs in International Relations: An Experimental Approach." *International Organization* 61(04).

Tomz, Michael, Jessica Weeks and Keren Yarhi-Milo. 2020. "Public Opinion and Decisions About Military Force in Democracies." *International Organization* 74(1):119–143.

Ubuki, Satoru. 2014. *Hiroshima Sengoshi [Hiroshima Post-war History].* Iwanami Shoten.

Van de Vyver, Julie, Diane Houston, Dominic Abrams and Milica Vasiljevic. 2016. "Boosting Belligerence: How the July 7, 2005, London Bombings Affected Liberals' Moral Foundations and Prejudice." *Psychological Science* 27(2):169–177.

Waltz, Kenneth N. 1979. *Theory of International Politics.* McGraw-Hill.

Wang, Yuhua. 2021. "The Political Legacy of Violence During China's Cultural Revolution." *British Journal of Political Science* 51(2):463–487.

Wang, Zheng. 2008. "National Humiliation, History Education, and the Politics of Historical Memory: Patriotic Education Campaign in China." *International Studies Quarterly* 52(4):783–806.

Wayne, Carly N., Sivan Hirsch-Hoefler, Masanori Kikuchi and Daphna Canetti. 2024. "Daily Struggles and Enduring Attitudes in Protracted Conflict: Evidence from Israel-Palestine.".

Wayne, Carly, Taylor Damann and Shani Fachter. 2023. "The Holocaust, the Socialization of Victimhood and Outgroup Political Attitudes in Israel." *Comparative Political Studies* Online First.

Wayne, Carly and Yuri Zhukov. 2022. "Never Again: The Holocaust and Political Legacies of Genocide." *World Politics* 74(3):367–404.

Weeks, Jessica L. 2008. "Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling Resolve." *International Organization* 62(1):35–64.

Williamson, Scott, Claire Adida, Adeline Lo, Melina Platas, Lauren Prather and Seth Werfel. 2021. "Family Matters: How Immigrant Histories Can Promote Inclusion." *American Political Science Review* 115(2):686–693.

Wittkopf, Eugene. 1990. *Faces of Internationalism: Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy*. Duke University Press.

Yoneyama, Lisa. 1999. *Hiroshima Traces: Time, Space, and the Dialectics of Memory*. University of California Press.

Zwigenberg, Ran. 2023. *Nuclear Minds: Cold War Psychological Science and the Bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki*. University of Chicago Press.

Online Appendix

Legacies of the Atomic Bombings:

Wartime Violence and Foreign Policy Attitudes

Contents (Appendix)

A Survey Items

Primary Dependent Variables

The former half of the primary dependent variables focus on support for specific foreign policy, each measured on a 7-point Likert scale.

- *Strengthen Defense*: Support for strengthening defense power (a 7-point likert scale)
- *Defense Spending*: Support for increasing defense spending (a 7-point likert scale)
- *Possessing Nuclear Weapons*: Support for possessing nuclear weapons (a 7-point likert scale)
- *Revising Article 9 of the Constitution*: Support for revising Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution (a 7-point likert scale)

The latter half of the primary dependent variables are `militant internationalism (MI)`, `cooperative internationalism (CI)`, and `Isolationism`. I create these variables by simple summation.

- *MI 1*: Rather than simply countering our opponents' thrusts, it is necessary to strike at the heart of an opponent's power (a 7-point likert scale)
- *MI 2*: Japan must demonstrate its resolve so that others do not take advantage of it (a 7-point likert scale)
- *MI 3*: Japan should always do what is in its own interest, even if our allies object (a 7-point likert scale)
- *MI 4*: Japan should take all steps including the use of force to prevent aggression by any expansionist power(a 7-point likert scale)
- *CI 1*: Japan needs to cooperate more with the United Nations (a 7-point likert scale)
- *CI 2*: Japan should contribute forces to international peace-keeping effort (a 7-point likert scale)
- *CI 3*: The use or threat of force sometimes creates more problems than it solves by creating hostility or fear on the part of the opposing side (a 7-point likert scale)
- *CI 4*: In deciding on its foreign policies, Japan should take into account the views of its major allies (a 7-point likert scale)
- *Isolation 1*: Japan should mind its own business internationally and let other countries get along the best they can on their own (a 7-point likert scale)
- *Isolation 2*: We should not think so much in international terms but concentrate more on our own national problems and building up our strength and prosperity here at home (a 7-point likert scale)

Exploratory Dependent Variables

For exploratory dependent variables shedding light on mechanisms, I ask the following items:

- *Morality of War*: To what extent do you agree or disagree that it can be morally justifiable to enter war depending on the objectives (a 5-point likert scale)
- *Threat of War*: To what extent do you think strengthening Japan's defense power will increase or decrease the threat of war or military conflict (a 5-point likert scale)
- *Trust in National Government*: To what extent do you trust or mistrust the Japanese government's intentions to strengthen its military (a 5-point likert scale)
- *Defense Policy as Provocative Action*: To what extent do you agree or disagree that strengthening defense power will provoke other countries (a 5-point likert scale)
- *Defense Policy as Deterrence*: To what extent do you agree or disagree that strengthening defense power will deter other countries (a 5-point likert scale)
- *Threat Perceptions in the East Asia region*: Do you feel threatened or not by the situation in East Asia surrounding Japan (a 5-point likert scale)

Channel Variables

I ask questions to create variables `Family` and `Public School Attendants`, using the following items. To construct `Family`, I use the following question:

- Did any family, relatives, or ancestors become victims of atomic bombings during World War II? How many?

  No, no one did; Yes, one person did; Yes, 2 or 3 people did; Yes, 4 or more people did.

and I create a dummy variable by assigning 0 for those who selected *No, no one did.* and 1 otherwise.

Regarding `Public School Attendants`, I ask:

- In what city or town did you attend elementary school? (Municipality and Prefecture; Multiple answers are allowed; Length)
- Was the elementary school(s) you went to public or private? (Multiple answers are allowed)
- In what city or town did you attend junior high school? (Municipality and Prefecture; Multiple answers are allowed; Length)

- Was the junior high school(s) you went to public or private? (Multiple answers are allowed)

`Public School Attendants` is created by assigning 1 if a respondent went to public elementary or junior high schools in Hiroshima or Nagasaki prefectures at any point and 0 otherwise.

For the validation of the exposure measures, I ask the following questions:

- What is the accurate time of the atomic bomb dropped in Hiroshima?
- What is the accurate time of the atomic bomb dropped in Nagasaki?
- What is the name of the aircraft that dropped the atomic bomb on Hiroshima?
- What is the name of the aircraft that dropped the atomic bomb on Nagasaki?
- Have you ever visited the memorial museums in Hiroshima or Nagasaki?
- Have you ever participated in the ceremonies in Hiroshima or Nagasaki?
- Have you ever read *Hadashi-no-Gen*?
- Do you discuss atomic bombings with your family? If so, how often?

I also ask the following questions prior to vignettes:

- *War as Realistic*: Japan will be at war with another country in the coming decade (a 5-point likert scale)
- *US as a Reliable Ally*: The US would help Japan if Japan were in a state of conflict with another country (a 5-point likert scale)
- *US as a Trustworthy Country*: The US is a trustworthy country for Japan (a 5-point likert scale)

B Regression Tables

Table B.1: Effect of Family on Foreign Policy Attitudes

	Dependent variable:						
	Strength.	Increase	Nuke	Revise	MI	CI	Iso.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Family	−0.083	−0.044	−0.117	−0.167^{+}	−0.179	−0.025	−0.236^{+}
	(0.083)	(0.083)	(0.092)	(0.100)	(0.210)	(0.199)	(0.133)
Income	0.030	0.035	0.019	0.024	−0.037	0.035	−0.041
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.025)	(0.027)	(0.057)	(0.053)	(0.034)
University	0.040	0.088	0.083	−0.064	0.150	0.161	−0.276*
	(0.072)	(0.073)	(0.081)	(0.089)	(0.184)	(0.174)	(0.114)
Female	−0.389***	−0.413***	−0.547***	−0.384***	−1.256***	0.003	−0.169
	(0.070)	(0.071)	(0.078)	(0.086)	(0.178)	(0.166)	(0.110)
Age	0.004^{+}	0.003	−0.002	0.008**	0.032***	0.027***	0.001
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.004)
Ideology	0.289***	0.313***	0.287***	0.265***	0.614***	0.017	0.177***
	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.065)	(0.064)	(0.041)
Vignette FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,872	1,872	1,872	1,872	1,872	1,872	1,872
Adjusted R^2	0.116	0.132	0.105	0.070	0.108	0.013	0.019
Note:							$^{+} < 0.1; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001$

Table B.2: Effect of Residence on Foreign Policy Attitudes

	Dependent variable:						
	Strength.	Increase	Nuke	Revise	MI	CI	Iso.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Current Residents	0.031	−0.002	−0.329***	−0.051	0.009	0.375*	0.206+
	(0.070)	(0.072)	(0.081)	(0.086)	(0.180)	(0.164)	(0.112)
Income	0.027	0.032	0.004	0.020	−0.040	0.052	−0.039
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.056)	(0.051)	(0.034)
University	0.044	0.090	0.049	−0.083	0.204	0.224	−0.238*
	(0.071)	(0.072)	(0.080)	(0.088)	(0.183)	(0.171)	(0.113)
Female	−0.395***	−0.413***	−0.566***	−0.394***	−1.200***	0.027	−0.151
	(0.069)	(0.070)	(0.077)	(0.085)	(0.176)	(0.163)	(0.109)
Age	0.003	0.002	−0.002	0.007*	0.032***	0.027***	0.001
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.004)
Ideology	0.282***	0.309***	0.276***	0.255***	0.617***	0.019	0.174***
	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.065)	(0.063)	(0.041)
Vignette FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,931	1,931	1,931	1,931	1,931	1,931	1,931
Adjusted R^2	0.112	0.129	0.108	0.065	0.107	0.016	0.018

Note: $^{+} < 0.1; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001$

Table B.3: Effect of Public School Attendance on Foreign Policy Attitudes

	Dependent variable:						
	Strength.	Increase	Nuke	Revise	MI	CI	Iso.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Public School Attendants	−0.015	−0.038	−0.381***	−0.085	0.132	0.463**	0.188+
	(0.067)	(0.068)	(0.076)	(0.083)	(0.171)	(0.159)	(0.106)
Income	0.027	0.035	0.003	0.019	−0.021	0.077	−0.030
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.024)	(0.026)	(0.055)	(0.050)	(0.034)
University	0.053	0.098	0.079	−0.092	0.221	0.163	−0.237*
	(0.072)	(0.073)	(0.080)	(0.088)	(0.181)	(0.171)	(0.113)
Female	−0.395***	−0.423***	−0.572***	−0.400***	−1.224***	−0.056	−0.152
	(0.069)	(0.071)	(0.077)	(0.085)	(0.176)	(0.163)	(0.109)
Age	0.003	0.001	−0.002	0.007*	0.029***	0.024***	−0.001
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.004)
Ideology	0.301***	0.327***	0.289***	0.274***	0.669***	0.056	0.195***
	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.041)
Vignette FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,887	1,887	1,887	1,887	1,887	1,887	1,887
Adjusted R^2	0.124	0.141	0.118	0.073	0.120	0.015	0.022

Note: $^{+} < 0.1; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001$

Table B.4: Effect of Family on Exploratory Outcomes

	Dependent variable:					
	Moral	Threat Rises	Trust in Gov.	Provoke	Deter	Threats
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Family	−0.068	0.0002	−0.022	−0.023	−0.044	0.162**
	(0.058)	(0.057)	(0.055)	(0.062)	(0.061)	(0.050)
Income	−0.008	−0.001	0.017	0.005	0.004	0.023+
	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.014)
University	−0.012	−0.033	0.071	−0.026	0.067	0.148**
	(0.052)	(0.050)	(0.051)	(0.056)	(0.053)	(0.046)
Female	−0.382***	0.284***	−0.260***	0.183***	−0.329***	−0.115**
	(0.050)	(0.048)	(0.049)	(0.053)	(0.051)	(0.044)
Age	−0.005**	−0.001	−0.001	−0.001	0.004*	0.013***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Ideology	0.151***	−0.129***	0.184***	−0.097***	0.205***	0.069***
	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.015)
Vignette FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,872	1,872	1,872	1,872	1,872	1,872
Adjusted R^2	0.090	0.061	0.101	0.025	0.114	0.074

Note: $^{+} < 0.1; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001$

Table B.5: Effect of Residence on Exploratory Outcomes

	Dependent variable:					
	Moral	Threat Rises	Trust in Gov.	Provoke	Deter	Threats
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Current Residents	-0.215^{***}	-0.009	-0.018	-0.132^{*}	0.071	0.045
	(0.052)	(0.049)	(0.050)	(0.054)	(0.052)	(0.045)
Income	-0.017	-0.003	0.014	-0.003	0.0004	0.022^{+}
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.014)
University	-0.029	-0.039	0.066	-0.034	0.078	0.149^{***}
	(0.051)	(0.049)	(0.050)	(0.055)	(0.053)	(0.045)
Female	-0.378^{***}	0.281^{***}	-0.267^{***}	0.180^{***}	-0.336^{***}	-0.110^{*}
	(0.049)	(0.047)	(0.048)	(0.052)	(0.050)	(0.043)
Age	-0.006^{***}	-0.001	-0.001	-0.002	0.004^{*}	0.013^{***}
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Ideology	0.152^{***}	-0.129^{***}	0.186^{***}	-0.095^{***}	0.204^{***}	0.076^{***}
	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.015)
Vignette FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,931	1,931	1,931	1,931	1,931	1,931
Adjusted R^2	0.098	0.061	0.103	0.027	0.115	0.068

Note: $^{+} < 0.1; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001$

Table B.6: Effect of Public School Attendance on Exploratory Outcomes

	Dependent variable:					
	Moral	Threat Rises	Trust in Gov.	Provoke	Deter	Threats
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Public School Attendants	-0.164^{***}	-0.044	-0.015	-0.110^{*}	0.017	0.042
	(0.049)	(0.047)	(0.048)	(0.053)	(0.050)	(0.043)
Income	-0.021	-0.005	0.015	-0.004	-0.003	0.020
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.014)
University	-0.012	-0.043	0.067	-0.025	0.072	0.153^{***}
	(0.051)	(0.050)	(0.051)	(0.055)	(0.052)	(0.045)
Female	-0.388^{***}	0.281^{***}	-0.277^{***}	0.175^{**}	-0.333^{***}	-0.116^{**}
	(0.050)	(0.048)	(0.049)	(0.053)	(0.051)	(0.044)
Age	-0.006^{***}	-0.001	-0.002	-0.002	0.003^{+}	0.013^{***}
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Ideology	0.157^{***}	-0.133^{***}	0.191^{***}	-0.098^{***}	0.214^{***}	0.085^{***}
	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.020)	(0.017)	(0.015)
Vignette FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,887	1,887	1,887	1,887	1,887	1,887
Adjusted R^2	0.098	0.064	0.107	0.027	0.122	0.072

Note: $^{+} < 0.1; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001$

C Robustness Checks

To assess the robustness of the findings presented in the main text, this section reports results from a series of additional analyses. However, due to page limitations, figures and regression tables could not be included in this file. To begin, I conducted a sensitivity analysis (Cinelli and Hazlett 2020) for the models estimating the effects on support for nuclear weapon possession and cooperative internationalism using the current residents and public school attendants variables. The results indicate that the observed effects are robust to confounding variables that are once, twice, or even three times as strong as the observed covariates: ideology and female for support for nuclear weapon possession, and ideology and age for cooperative internationalism. These covariates were selected based on having the highest t-values in each model.

In addition, I ran additional OLS models to further test the robustness of the findings. First, I created a categorical variable to distinguish residents of Hiroshima and Nagasaki prefectures instead of combining them. The results showed similar patterns in attitudes toward nuclear weapons, while support for cooperative internationalism was significant only in Nagasaki prefecture. In another model specification, I distinguished public schools in Hiroshima and Nagasaki prefectures. The results indicated that attendees of public schools in both prefectures strongly preferred anti-nuclear weapon attitudes and cooperative internationalism. I also explored whether a similar pattern existed among those who attended public elementary or junior high schools in Hiroshima or Nagasaki city. The results suggested similar patterns, but support for cooperative internationalism was significant only at the 10% level. Additionally, I used a continuous variable to capture the proportion of time spent attending public schools in Hiroshima or Nagasaki prefecture, relative to the maximum of nine years. Analyses with this variable fully replicated the results obtained using the binary variable for schooling.

Finally, I explored the effect of several placebo variables. The placebo variables are whether one attended a non-public school in Hiroshima or Nagasaki prefecture (*Non-public School Attendants*), whether one currently lives in Hiroshima or Nagasaki but did not attend school or was not born there (*Migrants*), and whether one has family members who were survivors or victims of air raids in Japan during World War II (e.g., Harada, Ito and Smith 2024), excluding the atomic bombings in Hiroshima and Nagasaki (*Air-raids Victims in Family Member*). The results show that the main findings in the main text remain robust, while all placebo variables fail to predict preferences about nuclear weapons and cooperative internationalism. Interestingly, individuals who have family member(s) victimized by air-raids during World War II, other than the atomic bombings, were significantly more likely to support militant internationalism. This suggests distinct consequences of being victimized by the atomic bombings, disastrous and traumatizing events, compared to relatively less severe bombings.

D Experimental Study

While the observational study revealed the static influence of having familial and community-level channels on foreign policy attitudes, I also present results from a vignette experiment that reminds respondents of the atomic bombings in a realistic context.

Research Design

To investigate whether awareness of past incidents will have a heterogeneous impact on foreign policy attitudes, I randomly assign respondents into three groups: `No Reminder`, `A-bomb`, and `Defeat` groups. While respondents in the control group receive no mention of past events (`No Reminder`), respondents in `A-bomb` and `Defeat` groups are presented with one of two reminders about Japan's experience in World War II:

A-bomb: *During World War II, Japan experienced the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, resulting in many deaths and people being exposed to radiation.*

Defeat: *During World War II, Japan suffered many deaths and was defeated by the Allies.*

The A-bomb reminder explicitly focuses on the bombings in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The defeat reminder emphasizes the casualties and Japan's defeat in World War II, which the atomic bombings may also symbolize. I meticulously designed this to remind respondents of the incident using text only, as images or videos could overly stimulate respondents' emotions.

Then, the respondents in all three groups read a vignette describing the augmentation of Japan's defensive capabilities:

> In recent years, the situation in East Asia surrounding Japan has been changing. According to the Ministry of Defense, Japan plans to strengthen its security by spending a record level of defense expenditures (over 7.9 trillion yen) in Fiscal Year 2024.
>
> This is the largest military expenditure for Japan in the Post-war period.

This scenario is fact-based and reflects the current fluctuations in regional security in East Asia, involving North Korea, China, and Russia, with the conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in power. In response to heightened security concerns from neighboring countries and demand from the U.S., the LDP government has pushed for a stronger defense posture, resulting in proposals for record-level defense spending.[26] While heightened security concerns may increase public support for assertive defense policy, reminders of the atomic bombings are expected to reduce this support if the hypotheses hold.

The sample consists of 612 participants in the control group, 611 in the `A-bomb` group, and 606 in the `Defeat` group.

[26] U.S. Naval Institute (Accessed on November 12, 2024)

To evaluate the treatment effects of the reminders for those with and without channels to atomic bombings, I use an OLS regression model:

$$y_i = \beta_1 \text{Treatment}_i + \beta_2 \text{Channel}_i + \beta_3 \text{Treatment}_i \times \text{Channel}_i + \sigma \mathbf{X_i} + \epsilon_i.$$

where y_i denotes dependent variables, Treatment_i indicates the treatment status, and Channel_i stands for the channel variable. In an exploration of conditional average treatment effects, I use `Family-Residents`, a categorical variable jointly examine the effects of `Family` and `Current Residents`. This variable is divided into four groups: individuals who have both victimized family members and currently reside in Hiroshima or Nagasaki (`Residents & Family`); individuals who have victimized family members but do not currently reside in Hiroshima or Nagasaki (`Family Only`); individuals who currently reside in Hiroshima or Nagasaki but do not have victimized family members (`Residents Only`); and individuals who fall into neither category, serving as the baseline group. Note that I could not explore triple interaction effects among `Family`, `Public School Attendants`, and `Current Residents` due to sample size constraints. $\mathbf{X_i}$ is a matrix for control variables, such as income, university, female, age, and ideology.

Results

Tables D.1 and D.2 present the estimates with interaction terms of the treatment and `Family-Residents` variables. The results show that respondents in the `Residents Only` and `Residents & Family` groups are less likely to support nuclear weapon possession compared to those without any channels to the bombings. The `Residents & Family` group also opposes the revision of Constitution Article 9. Additionally, the `Family Only` group tends to oppose militant internationalism and isolationism compared to those without any channels.

Regarding the heterogeneous treatment effects of reminders, the `A-bomb` reminder significantly impacts `CI` among the `Residents & Family` group. Figure D.1 visualizes the difference-in-means for each group. The figure reveals a statistically significant effect of the `A-bomb` reminder, specifically a 4.4% increase in support for `CI`, even after applying p-value adjustments using the false discovery rate (FDR) method (Benjamini and Hochberg 1995).

The `Defeat` reminder also has a significant positive effect on support for defense spending, nuclear weapon possession, and revision of Constitution Article 9 among the `Residents & Family` group. Unexpectedly, the national defeat reminder appears to trigger a hawkish backlash among individuals with both familial- and community-level channels to the bombings.

These findings from the experimental study align closely with the observational study presented in the main text. They underscore the lasting influence of the atomic bombings, with individuals' community-level channels shaping foreign policy attitudes, particularly opposition to nuclear weapon possession, even without reminders. Notably, the atomic bombing reminder significantly increased support for cooperative internationalism among those with close proximity to the bombings, suggesting that heightened saliency of the bombings can amplify their propensity to prefer cooperative internationalism.

Table D.1: Treatment Effects on Policy Support Conditional on Familial-Residents Channels

	Dependent Variables			
	Strengthen Def.	Increase Spend.	Possess Nuke	Revise Const.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
A-bomb	0.141	0.031	0.079	0.090
	(0.139)	(0.148)	(0.169)	(0.175)
Defeat	−0.116	−0.183	−0.222	−0.172
	(0.148)	(0.149)	(0.170)	(0.181)
Residents Only	−0.131	−0.203	−0.319*	−0.160
	(0.131)	(0.135)	(0.155)	(0.167)
Family Only	−0.558	−0.346	0.109	0.011
	(0.365)	(0.386)	(0.395)	(0.371)
Residents & Family	−0.061	−0.195	−0.376+	−0.433*
	(0.173)	(0.175)	(0.196)	(0.207)
A-bomb × Residents Only	−0.186	−0.020	−0.121	−0.063
	(0.188)	(0.194)	(0.221)	(0.234)
Defeat × Residents Only	0.186	0.314	0.178	0.357
	(0.188)	(0.191)	(0.219)	(0.235)
A-bomb × Family Only	−0.591	−0.392	−0.206	−0.148
	(0.463)	(0.463)	(0.517)	(0.512)
Defeat × Family Only	−0.228	−0.056	−0.099	−0.761
	(0.471)	(0.493)	(0.539)	(0.561)
A-bomb × Residents & Family	−0.145	0.055	−0.418	0.034
	(0.241)	(0.248)	(0.271)	(0.296)
Defeat × Residents & Family	0.290	0.468+	0.459+	0.716*
	(0.242)	(0.243)	(0.273)	(0.291)
Constant	2.628***	2.406***	1.832***	2.305***
	(0.216)	(0.219)	(0.255)	(0.269)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,872	1,872	1,872	1,872

R^2	0.134	0.143	0.121	0.081
Adjusted R^2	0.127	0.135	0.113	0.073

Note: $^{+} < 0.1; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001$

Table D.2: Treatment Effects on Foreign Policy Views Conditional on Familial-Residents Channels

	Dependent Variables		
	MI	CI	Isolationism
	(1)	(2)	(3)
A-bomb	−0.120	−0.094	−0.144
	(0.350)	(0.314)	(0.230)
Defeat	−0.198	−0.113	−0.118
	(0.348)	(0.287)	(0.230)
Residents Only	−0.435	−0.302	0.021
	(0.336)	(0.294)	(0.218)
Family Only	−2.046*	−1.326	−1.684**
	(0.939)	(1.003)	(0.551)
Residents & Family	−0.115	−0.254	0.008
	(0.395)	(0.348)	(0.283)
A-bomb × Residents Only	0.348	0.634	0.199
	(0.476)	(0.440)	(0.297)
Defeat × Residents Only	0.283	0.317	0.025
	(0.471)	(0.410)	(0.296)
A-bomb × Family Only	2.087	−0.060	1.017
	(1.328)	(1.308)	(0.763)
Defeat × Family Only	0.276	−1.437	1.043
	(1.338)	(1.312)	(0.776)
A-bomb × Residents & Family	−0.440	1.154*	−0.050
	(0.582)	(0.521)	(0.388)
Defeat × Residents & Family	0.516	0.746	0.051
	(0.588)	(0.531)	(0.389)

Constant	12.915***	15.821***	7.955***
	(0.569)	(0.543)	(0.370)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,872	1,872	1,872
R^2	0.121	0.036	0.033
Adjusted R^2	0.113	0.028	0.024
Note:	$^{+} < 0.1; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001$		



Figure D.1: Conditional Treatment Effect on Cooperative Internationalism
Notes: The figure shows the treatment effects, 95% confidence intervals with robust standard errors, and adjusted p-values for each group. All models include covariates.

E Interaction Effect of Familial and Community-level Channels

In this section, I report the results of the interaction effects of `Family` and `Current Resident`. Tables E.1 and E.2 show the effects on primary and exploratory dependent variables. Table E.3 reports the effect of `Family` and `Current Resident` interactions, the effect of `Family`, and the effect of having family members who were victimized or survived the air-raids in Japan during World War II, other than the atomic bombings.

Table E.1: Familial-School Channels and Policy Support

	Dependent variable:						
	Strength.	Increase	Nuke	Revise	MI	CI	Iso.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Residents Only	-0.133^{+}	-0.107	-0.304^{***}	-0.064	-0.229	0.019	0.095
	(0.077)	(0.080)	(0.090)	(0.096)	(0.195)	(0.175)	(0.121)
Family Only	-0.822^{***}	-0.488^{*}	0.007	-0.288	-1.302^{*}	-1.802^{***}	-1.019^{**}
	(0.187)	(0.190)	(0.214)	(0.227)	(0.547)	(0.524)	(0.314)
Residents & Family	-0.016	-0.023	-0.367^{**}	-0.187	-0.095	0.385^{+}	0.008
	(0.099)	(0.101)	(0.112)	(0.122)	(0.243)	(0.223)	(0.158)
Vignette FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,872	1,872	1,872	1,872	1,872	1,872	1,872
Adjusted R^2	0.126	0.135	0.111	0.069	0.111	0.026	0.025
Note:							$^{+} < 0.1; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001$

Table E.2: Familial-Residence Channels and Exploratory DVs

	Dependent variable:					
	Moral Views	Threat Rises	Trust in Gov.	Provoke	Deter	Threats
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Residents Only	-0.191^{***}	0.023	-0.041	-0.107^{+}	0.005	-0.033
	(0.058)	(0.055)	(0.057)	(0.061)	(0.058)	(0.051)
Family Only	0.070	0.127	-0.090	0.127	-0.401^{**}	-0.082
	(0.137)	(0.126)	(0.128)	(0.142)	(0.139)	(0.125)
Residents & Family	-0.239^{***}	-0.011	-0.037	-0.134^{+}	0.040	0.193^{**}
	(0.071)	(0.070)	(0.068)	(0.076)	(0.073)	(0.060)
Vignette FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,872	1,872	1,872	1,872	1,872	1,872
Adjusted R^2	0.097	0.061	0.101	0.027	0.119	0.076
Note:						$^{+} < 0.1; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001$

Table E.3: Perceptions of the U.S.

	Dependent variable:					
	US Would Help			Trust US		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Residents Only	−0.006			0.084^{+}		
	(0.045)			(0.050)		
Family Only	−0.447***			−0.332*		
	(0.122)			(0.131)		
Residents & Family	0.001			0.044		
	(0.057)			(0.066)		
Family		−0.077			−0.075	
		(0.048)			(0.055)	
Air-raids Victims in Family Member			−0.171***			−0.089
			(0.051)			(0.059)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,872	1,872	1,811	1,872	1,872	1,811
Adjusted R^2	0.052	0.043	0.051	0.013	0.007	0.008

Note: $^{+} < 0.1; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001$

References for Online Appendix

Canetti, Daphna, Gilad Hirschberger, Carmit Rapaport, Julia Elad-Strenger, Tsachi Ein-Dor, Shifra Rosenzveig, Tom Pyszczynski and Stevan E. Hobfoll. 2018. "Collective Trauma From the Lab to the Real World: The Effects of the Holocaust on Contemporary Israeli Political Cognitions." *Political Psychology* 39(1):3–21.

Cinelli, Carlos and Chad Hazlett. 2020. "Making sense of sensitivity: extending omitted variable bias." *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society: Series B (Statistical Methodology)* 82(1):39–67.

Fouka, Vasiliki and Hans-Joachim Voth. 2023. "Collective Remembrance and Private Choice: German–Greek Conflict and Behavior in Times of Crisis." *American Political Science Review* 117(3):851–870.

Harada, Masataka, Gaku Ito and Daniel M. Smith. 2024. "Destruction from Above: Long-Term Legacies of the Tokyo Air Raids." *The Journal of Politics* 86(2):782–797.