

(Preregistration Draft) Legacies of Settler Mortality and Historical Memory in Settlers' Home Regions

Jing Xu* and Harunobu Saijo †‡

September 19, 2024

Abstract

Past studies show groups victimized by collective violence exhibit heterogeneous outcomes such as increased hostility or greater tolerance towards outgroups. Victimized groups are often also perpetrators. We propose that balanced framing, or recognizing victimhood while acknowledging perpetration may be more effective in reducing hostility than either alone. We will test this with the case of Japanese settlers from Nagano Prefecture who faced violence during evacuation from Manchuria with a planned survey of respondents from Nagano. Mainstream narratives in Nagano emphasize both their role as perpetrators and victims. Using an instrumental variables approach, we will demonstrate that greater exposure to victimization leads contemporary survey respondents to exhibit as yet unmeasured attitudes towards the perpetrator group and other outgroups when such narratives dominate. Additionally, treating respondents with balanced framing in a vignette experiment results in as yet unmeasured attitudes towards China and other outgroups, compared to other framings.

*Postdoctoral Fellow, Tsinghua University. Email: crystalxu_zju@163.com

†Assistant Professor, Hiroshima University, International Economic Development Program. Email: saijo@hiroshima-u.ac.jp

‡We would like to thank the Manmou Heiwa Kinenkan ("Peace Memorial Museum for Manchurian-Mongolian Development") for kindly providing us with their dataset of Japanese settlers from Nagano prefecture and a detailed map showing the locations of the Japanese settlements in Manchuria.

1 Introduction

State-sponsored violence, inter-group conflicts, and other forms of group-based collective political violence have affected millions in the last century, and continues on ongoing conflicts such as those in Ukraine, Palestine, and the Sudan. Such cases of group-based collective violence can result in long-running consequences, such as political preferences, political participation, social cohesion, attitudes towards the perpetrator, in-group preferences, and attitudes towards out-groups. Under such circumstances, what narratives become prevalent among the victimized group can have a great impact on what attitudes arise among that group, and in society as a whole.

Groups subject to collective violence are often neither purely victims nor perpetrators, but members of such groups were often engaged in both roles over time. We suggest that *balanced* narratives which highlight both the victimhood and perpetrator status of the victimized group in question can ameliorate negative attitudes towards the perpetrator group among the victims and lead to greater generalized tolerance towards outgroups. This study tests this proposition on the case of Japanese settlers in Manchuria from Nagano Prefecture, who were subject to high levels of collective violence following the collapse of Japanese rule in 1945. We test the impact of this collective violence on contemporary attitudes towards perpetrator groups (China) and unrelated outgroups (such as foreign workers and refugees) in Nagano Prefecture today using a regionally targeted survey with an instrumental variables approach. We will further test whether our proposed mechanism is at play through a randomized vignette survey experiment. This research contributes to the literatures on the long-term legacies of collective violence and conflict, and also demonstrates a potential consequence of failed colonial settlement schemes.

Existing studies find divergent outcomes; on the one hand, a set of studies find that collective violence results in a backlash, hardening attitudes against the perpetrator and strengthening in-group preferences, while others find that such exposure leads to more openness towards outgroups.

Victimization often results in a backlash. One example of such a backlash is "competitive victimhood", where groups rhetorically compete over their victimhood status vis-a-vis other groups to gain support for their cause. This logic is sometimes used to justify further violence, which may lead to negative feedback loops of mutual collective violence (Young and Sullivan, 2016). Similarly, a substantial body of literature finds that groups subject to collective violence strengthen their in-group identity, and retains higher levels of hostility against the perpetrators, even decades after the violence (Balcells, 2012; Fouka and Voth, 2023; Hadzic and Tavits, 2019; Lupu and Peisakhin, 2017; Rozenas, Schutte, and Y. Zhukov, 2017). Such collective traumas can also result in identity-based grievances that can shape political behavior long after the original events (Menon, 2023). Such backlash tends to occur in cases where the group is subject to ongoing security

threats or conflict, or perceive that their grievances have not been recognized (Dinas, Fouka, and Schläpfer, 2021b) or addressed by the wider society.

Alternatively, collective violence can also lead to more openness and outgroup tolerance. The literature on "inclusive victimhood" highlights how exposure to collective violence can also engender more tolerant attitudes towards outgroups (Vollhardt, 2009). Subsequent finds show that narratives that highlight mutual suffering can reduce competitive victimhood and intergroup hostility (Adelman et al., 2016). Similarly, the political science literature on long-term legacies of collective violence finds that such groups may show more sympathy to outgroups, such as refugees of contemporary conflicts, unrelated to the original conflict (Wayne and Y. M. Zhukov, 2022). Furthermore, works such as Dinas, Fouka, and Schläpfer, 2021a finds that those with family histories of victimization are more responsive to perspective taking, and parallels between the in-group suffering and the plight of contemporary out-groups, in this case contemporary conflict refugees. Cases where group victimization leads to openness seems to be more common in instances where the victimized group no longer face a security threat from the original perpetrator or third parties. That being said, examples of inclusive victimhood frames sometimes work in ongoing conflict situations, such as among Israeli Jews (Adelman et al., 2016).

1.1 Balanced Framing

As conflicts often involve mutual collective violence between the parties involved, victim and perpetrator are not mutually exclusive groups (Bilali and Vollhardt, 2019); victimized groups are often simultaneously perpetrators. Therefore, it is important to reconcile this duality when constructing historical memory to ameliorate future antagonisms. While recognition of victimhood has already been shown to increase outgroup tolerance (Dinas, Fouka, and Schläpfer, 2021b), groups can simultaneously pursue competitive victimhood narratives that can escalate future conflicts. In contrast, directly accusing someone of belonging to a group which perpetrated of odious acts can elicit offense and a defensive posture that may also increase antagonism.

To highlight a possible resolution to this issue, we propose the concept of *balanced narratives* regarding victimization. This is when a narrative *acknowledges the suffering of the victimized group, while also addressing the past wrongdoings of that group*. Narratives that highlight both aspects in a *balanced* manner may be able to address a group's desire for recognition of victimhood while getting the group to reconsider their past wrongdoings. Table 1 highlights what we mean; it may be possible to narrate events without highlighting the victimhood or perpetration of the group in question (the "no framing" cell), or to cast them as purely victims or purely perpetrators; balanced framing would be when both are done simultaneously.

Balanced framing differs from inclusive victimhood narratives. There is no explicit attempt to frame any

Table 1: Balanced Framing

	Frame group as victims		
		Yes	No
Frame group as perpetrators	Yes	"Balanced" Framing	Perpetrator Framing
	No	Victim Framing	No framing

commonality between the ingroup and the outgroup, in our case, but rather an attempt to provide a balanced narrative for the ingroup. Thus, it is more parsimonious and does not require the other (perpetrator) side to participate.

Therefore, in a case where such a balanced framing narrative became dominant, we should expect the following:

Exposure Hypothesis: *Greater* exposure to collective victimization should be associated with more *positive* attitudes towards perpetrator group and outgroups.

Furthermore, these narratives are likely to shape the impact of victimization on the aggressiveness in ongoing interstate disputes between the host country for the victim group and the perpetrator group. Recognition should ameliorate attitudes towards the perpetrator group, while recognition of the victim group's own perpetration may constrain aggressive stances regarding such disputes.

Aggression Hypothesis: *Greater* exposure to collective victimization should be associated with *less aggressive* stances on interstate disputes between the victim group's host country and the perpetrator group's host country

Finally, if the balanced narratives are actually driving the direction of the relationship, rather than being an incidental factor, we should expect individuals to show more positive attitudes towards the perpetrator group and other outgroups when shown narratives with balanced framing than other framings. Therefore,

Balanced Framing Hypothesis: Those shown balanced framing should result in more positive attitudes towards the perpetrator group and outgroups than baseline/perpetrator/victim framing

Finally, if this is really driving the long-run historical relationship, we should expect that the aforementioned effect is stronger among those with a greater exposure to victimization, such as through living in a locality exposed to higher levels of victimization or having personal connections to victims.

Conditional Balanced Framing Hypothesis: The effect of the balanced framing should be stronger among those living in localities exposed to higher levels of victimization or having personal connections to victims

The following section provides background information on the case at hand, followed by a section on data which describes the historical data, particulars of the planned survey, followed by a discussion of the

analysis. A discussion section concludes.

2 Japanese Settlement in Manchuria (Nagano Prefecture)

Figure 1: Nagano Prefecture and Associated Settlements in Manchuria (1945)



The settlements in the diagram are based on a geolocated dataset of Japanese settlements from (Saijo and Xu, 2024); the dataset is restricted to those which explicitly list Nagano Prefecture as a major source of settlers, as well as those that indicate "various" prefectures, which likely contain settlers from Nagano given the large number of settlers from Nagano.

2.1 Japanese Agricultural Emigration to Manchuria

Manchuria, now Northeast China, fell under Japanese influence following the 1906 Japanese victory in the Russo-Japanese War. Japan obtained control over the Southern Manchurian Railway and adjacent territories, as well as the tip of the Liaodong Peninsula (Patrikeeff, Elleman, and Kotkin, 2002). They were also allowed to permanently garrison an Imperial Japanese Army unit called the Kwantung Army to defend it. Following the collapse of the Qing Dynasty in 1911, the rest of the region fell under the rule of the warlords of the Fengtien clique, headed by ex-bandit turned warlord Zhang Zuolin, who was later assassinated in 1928 after

refusing to cooperate despite Japanese military support. His son Zhang Xueliang was thought to be more malleable, but aligned himself with the Nanking government under Chiang Kai-shek, who was opposed to Japanese influence in the region. Finding this situation intolerable, elements in the Kwantung Army instigated the Manchurian Incident independently of Tokyo and established control over the entire region, deposing Zhang. They created Manchukuo, a puppet government under Kwantung Army control (Paine, 2015).

During this period, a policy was floated among some Japanese circles to settle marginal elements of the Japanese peasantry in Manchuria, to solve the problem of rural economic stagnation arising from the excess of land-poor farmers and to bolster Japanese control over the region. From 1932 to 1936, little progress was made on this front with little more than three thousand "experimental settlers", but in 1936, the Hiroda cabinet adopted settlement in Manchuria as official government policy, implementing policies that ended with over 250 thousand Japanese settlers in Manchuria by August 1945. Settlement types included those who had emigrated as households and sometimes grouped by place of origin as well as groups of young boys who were organized in a paramilitary fashion. Much of the land was already under cultivation and forcibly purchased from local landowners in Manchuria, and was parceled out to Japanese households as smallholdings. A third of the settlers perished following the 1945 Soviet invasion and collapse of Japanese rule due to violence by the Soviets, bandits, violence from locals, starvation, disease, and mass suicides (H. Kobayashi, 1976).

In balance, much like in other cases of group victimization and group conflict, the experience of these migrants includes perpetration and victimization. Examples of victimization include:

- Quasi-coercive recruitment of settlers by state and local notables in Japan
- Abandonment by Japanese military and government after Soviet incursion
- Violence, abuse, mistreatment by Soviet and Chinese military, local civilians, other settlers, etc
- Difficulty or inability to return and poverty/stigmatization after return

For the perpetration, common themes include:

- Settlement in forcibly acquired land
- Exploitation of local Chinese
- Violence against local Chinese

We will focus on the traumatic experiences and violence that many settlers experienced at the end of the war as the primary victimization event, and settlement on forcibly acquired land as the primary form of perpetration.

2.2 Emigration from Nagano

2.2.1 Case Selection

We focus on Nagano Prefecture because it is an exemplary region with high levels of emigration to Manchuria, high levels of variance in emigration and fatalities from emigration, which makes the primary analysis possible. In addition, uniquely fine-grained individual-level emigration data is available for Nagano, which is not available elsewhere. Finally, emigration is widely known and remembered in Nagano and is included in compulsory peace education curriculum, which is not the case elsewhere in Japan. Unlike other issues of victimization and memorialization in Japan, such as war veterans and nuclear bombing victims, the Japanese settlers came to be remembered through a balanced framing due to historically contingent events that were particular to this region. Thus, while the relationships observed may not be representative of Japan as a whole, it allows us to empirically test the causal effect of victimization under the predominance of balanced framing, and test the effect of different narratives on stated sentiments towards the perpetrator group and other outgroups.

As a land-locked region located in the center of the main island of Japan, Nagano contributed the largest number (both in absolute numbers and in proportion of population) of agricultural emigrants out of any prefecture (Araragi, 1994, pp. 59, 92). By 1945, the prefecture had sent over 30 thousand settlers (33,865 confirmed in our dataset) of all types, which was 2% of Nagano’s 1935 population according to the census, of whom around a half (or 1% of 1935 population) did not return according to our dataset, indicating a higher fatality rate than in the rest of the country ¹. Figure 1 shows the location of Nagano Prefecture within Japan in relation to Manchuria and the locations of Japanese settlements likely containing people from Nagano Prefecture.

2.2.2 The Rise of Balanced Framing Surrounding Manchurian Emigration in Nagano

How did narratives surrounding Japanese colonial settlement crystallize around the “balanced” framing in Nagano Prefecture, and became a part of the curriculum there? Emphasizing the victimhood of the ex-settlers was likely inevitable due to the hardships they experienced. However, this event being widely remembered and the mainstream narratives coming to prominently featuring perpetration was particular to Nagano Prefecture, and requires some explanation. The following section illustrates how this narrative came about due to the historical contingencies surrounding the situation of returnee agricultural emigrants, the development of their social movements, and engagement with the Japanese state, and how it managed to

¹To compare, there were about 7.1 million military personnel at the end of the war (Koga, Makito, 2006), which was about 10% of the entire Japanese population according to the 1940 census, with military deaths amounting to about 2.3 million according to the Ministry of Health, Labour, and Welfare, or 3% of the population.

become dominant in Nagano.

Following the collapse of Manchukuo, agricultural migrants from Nagano Prefecture suffered greatly in their attempts to return to Japan. Many were killed, starved, or died of disease, and subjected to considerable abuse by local people, KMT, CCP, and Soviet forces. They were effectively abandoned by the Japanese government, as the Kwantung Army retreated behind them, though some settlements received orders to evacuate at the last minute. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs also told them to stay in place (Zao, 2016, pp. 56–57). A number of the settlers made it out and appealed to the American occupation to make arrangements to evacuate Japanese civilians under KMT control. After the harsh winter of 1945–46, evacuations began out of Huludao in near Jinzhou in southwestern Manchuria and continued until 1947. Those considered to be military personnel and interred by the Soviets were released starting in 1950. After the CCP took over northeast China, evacuations of Japanese civilians stopped, but resumed after 1953. As relations between Japan and Communist China soured, group evacuations ceased in 1956 and were not resumed until the normalization of relations between Beijing and Tokyo in 1972, though some were evacuated on an individual basis (Nagano Ken Kaitaku Jikokai Manshu Kaitakushi Kanko-kai, 1984, pp. 754–765).

Back in Nagano, the organizations formed to mobilize the settlers were repurposed as aid organizations for the returnees. Both the prefectural and national governments organized extragovernmental organizations with public funding to assist the returned settlers. The returnees themselves organized the 長野県開拓自興会 (Nagano Prefecture Settler Self-Help Association) alongside other groups and were given public funds to operate welfare schemes. With government support, there were partially successful attempts to settle marginal lands within Japan and develop them for agriculture. Returnees received support for obtaining housing, necessities, and medical care, received a temporary stipend for living expenses, and support for finding employment (ibid., pp. 729–736).

By the 2010s, the returnees' organizations, prefectural educational committee materials on peace education, as well as the newly created Memorial Museum for Agricultural Emigrants to Manchuria (founded by private initiative in 2013) had all converged upon narratives that contained features of balanced framing: recognition of the settlers' victimhood and suffering while acknowledging them as perpetrators against the local people in Manchuria. This development was not a foreordained function of the historical event, but rather a product of postwar contingencies that shaped what became the dominant narrative in Nagano Prefecture.

The returnees faced severe challenges when trying to speak publicly about their plight after evacuation. Historical and sociological researchers argue that ex-settlers were prevented from memorializing their experiences due to the following factors (Zao, 2016, pp. 473–475):

- Traumatic nature of their experiences
- Democratic-pacifist mainstream narratives in postwar Japan demonizing ex-settlers as imperialist vanguards
- Pressure from local elites and officials who were complicit in mobilizing settlers
- Poverty in the immediate postwar due to lack of assets

At the time, there were movements speaking publicly about their situation, for example, to appeal to the Japanese and Chinese governments to bring back those left behind in China, or to advocate for welfare and compensation for lost property. However, clear narratives were yet to emerge beyond these appeals.

The first wave of commemoration was based on the quasi-public advocacy and aid organization Settler Self-Help Association. The national-level organization was led by those who had advocated for and administered the push to emigrate to Manchuria. Their narratives reflected this background, and the accompanying memorial epitaphs and the announcements made during the memorials were mostly valorizing or neutral in tone, greatly underplaying both the sense of betrayal and the victimization of the people the settlers displaced. These texts often directly repeated prewar ideological lines, terminology, and ideas, and tended to affirm the emigration scheme as a legitimate development project to build ethnic harmony in Manchuria. These narratives were reflected in most official commemorations Nagano as well, including in the wording of the commemorative monuments and the messages read aloud during commemorations, due to the influence of the national organizations (Zao, 2016, pp. 475–480)(Iida City Historical Research Institute, 2009, pp. 219–224).

These commemorations were able to overcome the demonization of the ex-settlers by the postwar democratic-pacifist historiography, and often successfully incorporated local elites into the commemorations by coalescing with veterans and war bereaved groups, but failed to fully encompass the narratives espoused by the settlers themselves. Some local commemorations reflected the personal attitudes of the returnees and had little official involvement—these tended to emphasize victimhood, alongside criticisms of the Japanese authorities, colonial aggression, and emphasized the need to prevent future conflicts (Zao, 2016, p. 486)(Iida City Historical Research Institute, 2009, pp. 219–224).

However, there were countervailing factors that led to the dominance of the latter narrative in Nagano Prefecture. The valorizing or neutral narrative under-emphasized the responsibility of the Japanese authorities and the Kwantung Army who mobilized the settlers and then abandoned them, and of local elites who encouraged emigration before 1945 but were often reluctant to support the returnees upon their repatriation. While the settlers themselves had mixed opinions about the validity and efficacy of the colonial settlement

policy, many understood that their settlements had displaced and victimized local people in Manchuria through wartime and postwar contacts with locals.

Furthermore, repeated engagement with the Chinese authorities meant that many, if they were not aware already, were exposed to the displacement and exploitation some locals in Manchuria experienced. Engagement increased substantially after Japan normalized relations with Communist China in 1972, and many ex-settlers directly visited Northeast China to visit their former sites, mourn the dead, and meet with those left in China. These visits increased awareness of perpetration among the returnees, and further strengthened pacifist sentiments and regret for victimizing the Chinese. Crucially, the prefectural educational association, the prefectural Sino-Japanese Friendship Association, and prefectural officials collaborated with ex-settler groups to achieve these exchanges due to the regret that prefectural leaders and educational authorities felt regarding their complicity in mobilizing the settlers in Nagano (Zao, 2016, pp. 492–496). Today, the "balanced narrative" is a part of the prefecture's official "peace education" programs, alongside topics seen elsewhere in Japan such as civilian victimization in the Battle of Okinawa, the incendiary bombings of major cities, nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the labor mobilization of Japanese and Koreans, as seen in Nagano-ken Kenko Fukushibu Chiiki Fukushika (2022), a leaflet on peace education produced by an organ of the prefectural administrative apparatus in 2022.

The creation and spread of this balanced framing narrative at the prefecture level was not a strict consequence of emigration, as this did not occur in other regions that sent many settlers, such as Kagawa Prefecture, where the history of emigration is barely taught or memorialized by the public authorities², despite sending 1.08 percent of the population to Manchuria before 1945 (Araragi, 1994, p. 92). Prefectural and municipal materials on peace education feature general war experiences, local incendiary air raids, and Hiroshima/Nagasaki but do not address emigration to Manchuria. Similarly, efforts to create narratives of historical memory surrounding the war understandably tended to emphasize victimization or valorize war heroes, while under-emphasizing perpetration. For example, advocates for the Japanese victims of indiscriminate incendiary and atomic bombings of Japanese cities by the United States tended to focus on Japanese victimization. Veterans and bereaved family members tended to valorize the war dead and actively campaigned against perpetration narratives (Lee, 2018).

²For example, the regional capital city of Takamatsu set up the Takamatsu Municipal Peace Memorial Museum in 2016 as a tool to conduct peace education on local students; there are specific exhibits for the air raids, wartime life, and Hiroshima/Nagasaki; references to "returnees" and "orphans left in China" are mentioned in passing on the "Takamatsu in the Postwar" section, but only in passing (Takamatsu-shi Heiwa Kinenkan, 2019). The website of the prefectural government (<https://www.pref.kagawa.lg.jp/>) does not return hits on emigration to Manchuria, and searches for 開拓団 ("settlement groups") only return references to emigration to Latin America, indicating that emigration to Manchuria-Mongolia is likely not a major component of the peace education curriculum. Informal interviews with people who grew up in Kagawa Prefecture (Sanuki-shi) in the 1990s also indicate that the main focus of the peace and human rights education that they were subjected to focused on the Takamatsu air raids and the issue of discrimination against Burakumin, and did not make any mention of emigration to Manchuria.

Table 2: Key Variables

Variable	Formula	Explanation
Emigration Rate	$\frac{emigration_i}{population_i}$	Proportion of Village i that emigrated
Death Rate for Emigrants	$\frac{deaths_i}{emigration_i}$	Death rate of emigrants from Village i
Nonreturn Rate for Emigrants	$\frac{nonreturn_i}{emigration_i}$	Nonreturn rate of emigrants from Village i
Village Death Rate from Emigration	$\frac{deaths_i}{population_i}$	Death rate for Village i from emigration
Village Nonreturn Rate from Emigration	$\frac{nonreturn_i}{population_i}$	Nonreturn rate for Village i from emigration

Formula explanation:

The unit here is the 1945 village, town, or municipality. For simplicity's sake, they will be called "village".

$population_i$ is the population of village i in 1935;

$emigration_i$ is the number of people who emigrated to Manchuria from village i ;

$death_i$ is the number of people from village i who emigrated and is confirmed to have died as a result of emigration;

$nonreturn_i$ is the number of people from village i who emigrated and did not return (died, went missing and never found, or remained in PRC).

3 Data and Survey Design

This project combines a natural experiment approach with a survey experiment. Historical data on the emigration and pre-treatment data will be matched with survey responses from respondents in Nagano Prefecture on a survey that will be conducted in the winter of 2024-25 by current location of the respondent and/or locality of origin on the basis of 1945 localities.

3.1 Nagano Prefecture Settler Data

The following individual and locality-level settlement and return/mortality data comes from the list of all 33,865 documented settlers from Nagano Prefecture compiled for the Nagano Prefecture History of Settlement in Manchuria (長野県満州開拓史), digitized by the Nagano Prefecture History Museum in 2012 and carried over by the private Peace Memorial Museum for Manchurian-Mongolian Development, as well as a table of 1945 city/town/village level tabulations. Using this data it is possible to generate useful summary statistics to discuss the viability of this study. The ex-settler groups in Nagano Prefecture are unique among their peers in Japan for having compiled such a detailed dataset which allows for fine-grained analysis. To our knowledge this data has not yet been used for quantitative analysis.

It is necessary to define the variables summarized in Table 2. One of the main treatment variables of interest in this study for the Exposure Hypothesis and the Aggression Hypothesis is the degree to which each locality (or survey respondent from that locality) was exposed to mortality or non-return arising from colonial settlement. Village death rate from emigration and village nonreturn rate from emigration are defined as the number of dead or non-returning settlers divided from a given locality in Nagano Prefecture by the 1935 population of that locality. This is the product of the death rate of those emigration rate (number of emigrants from a locality in Nagano divided by the 1935 population) and the death or nonreturn rate for emigrants (that is, the death rate for those who emigrated, or the number of dead or nonreturned emigrants

from a locality in Nagano divided by the number of emigrants from that locality). The rest of this paper will use both death and nonreturn rates from emigration in a locality as treatment as many went missing without confirmation of death.

Table 3 summarizes emigration and settler fatality where each unit is the 1945-era locality in Nagano Prefecture.

Table 4 summarizes individual-level characteristics and the proportion of the fates of the settlers. Table 5 summarizes the characteristics of the settlements in Manchuria which contained people from Nagano prefecture, with the caveat that many of these settlements likely included people from other regions in Japan, who are not included in this dataset.

Table 3: Summary of Emigration and Exposure to Settler Mortality Across Localities in Nagano Pref.

Statistic	N	Min	Pctl(25)	Median	Pctl(75)	Max	Mean	St. Dev.
Agricultural Emigrants	384	0	18	37	71	896	67.26	101.06
Patriotic Farms/Lab Service Corps	384	0	0	1	3	42	2.66	4.77
Youth Volunteer Corps	384	0	8	13	20	86	16.03	12.87
Number Returned	384	1	16	28	46	694	44.09	59.65
Number Died	384	0	13	23	42	432	38.95	50.71
Number Remaining	384	0	0	1	3	36	2.24	4.12
Number Unknown	384	0	0	0	1	36	0.62	2.23
1935 Population	384	634	2,457.8	3,263	4,493.2	77,325	4,457.83	6,445.75
Total Emigration	384	1	32	52.5	94	984	85.90	109.16
Death Rate of Emigrated	384	0.00	0.35	0.44	0.53	0.85	0.44	0.14
Nonreturn Rate of Emigrated	384	0.00	0.38	0.48	0.56	0.91	0.47	0.14
Emigration Rate	384	0.001	0.01	0.02	0.03	0.31	0.02	0.03
Death Rate for Locality	384	0.00	0.004	0.01	0.01	0.16	0.01	0.02
Nonreturn Rate for Locality	384	0.00	0.004	0.01	0.01	0.16	0.01	0.02
Nr. of Sett. Destinations	384	0	8	11	14	33	11.66	5.39
Fractionalization of Sett. Destinations	384	0.00	0.64	0.77	0.85	1.00	0.71	0.20

Table 4: Summary of Individual Emigrants from Nagano Pref.

Statistic	N	Min	Pctl(25)	Median	Pctl(75)	Max	Mean	St. Dev.
Age in 1945	32,054	0	9	18	29	96	20.78	14.75
Male	33,822	0	0	1	1	1	0.61	0.49
Returned Alive	33,865	0	0	1	1	1	0.52	0.50
Remained in Manchuria	33,865	0	0	0	0	1	0.03	0.16
Perished	33,865	0	0	0	1	1	0.45	0.50

As Table 3, which summarizes emigration information across 1945 cities, towns, and villages shows, there was considerable variation in the emigration rate across localities in Nagano (0.1% to 31%), as well as great variation in the death rates of those who emigrated (ranging 35 to 85% death rates and 38 to 91% non-return rates, where non-return includes missing and those who remained), resulting in a considerable amount of variation in the rate at which each locality was exposed to from settler mortality (anywhere from zero to

Table 5: Summary of Settlements in Manchuria (From Nagano Only)

Statistic	N	Min	Pctl(25)	Median	Pctl(75)	Max	Mean	St. Dev.
Number of Settlers from Nagano	108	3	115.8	221.5	322	1,616	314.06	320.02
Number of Places of Origin in Nagano	108	1	12	25	62.5	166	40.57	37.76
Age	108	14.40	19.76	21.39	22.46	34.87	20.93	2.87
Male	108	0.27	0.51	0.54	0.96	1.00	0.68	0.22
Rate Returned Alive	108	0.11	0.43	0.62	0.78	1.00	0.60	0.22

16% of the local 1935 population taken from the 1935 census). Furthermore, we can see that many localities sent people to different settlements ("Nr. of Sett. Destinations"); the median locality sent residents to 11 settlements. "Fractionalization of Sett. Destinations" computes the degree to which those who emigrated from a given locality were concentrated in a small number of settlements; the fractionalization measure used here follows Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization (ELF), which computes the likelihood of any two randomly selected units belonging to the same group. The median is 0.77, with a mean of 0.71 and ranging from 0 to 1, showing that while settlement from a given locality tended to somewhat concentrate in one place, with some localities sending all of their settlers to one location, most localities had some dispersion of settlers across multiple settlements. From the point of view of individual colonial settlements, we can also see that each settlement tended to include people from different locations in Nagano, and varied considerably in terms of survival rate as seen in Table 5.

Figure 2 and 3 visualizes the geographical distribution of values for the variables summarized in Table 3. As the visualization shows, both the emigration rates and the death/nonreturn rates from emigration in the sending locality are concentrated in particular parts of the prefecture, especially the southern, eastern, and western tips. There is also considerable variation in the death or nonreturn rates for those who emigrated, as Figure 3 shows.

3.2 Other Observational Data

3.2.1 Pre-treatment Characteristics

Aside from the settlement and data shown above, we will collect several pre-treatment variables. First, city/town/village level rice farming area, rice harvest, and silkworm production quantity and price are available for most years. We will focus on 1934, since this predates most of the settlements. We will collect village-level distribution of smallholder and tenant farmland. These data are available from the statistical annex of the History of Nagano Prefecture, Sources for Modern Era, Statistics Vols. 1 and 2 (長野県史近代史料編別巻統計1 and 2) published in 1981 and 85 respectively. These factors are likely to drive resettlement quotas, demand for voluntary emigration, and applications for subsidies in return for mobilizing

Figure 2: Emigration, Emigration Death, and Emigration Nonreturn as a Proportion of Sending Locality





Figure 3: Death or Nonreturn as a Proportion of Those Who Emigrated



settlers. These underlying economic structures are also likely to drive postwar politics, so may be important confounders. Thus, our main results will include these pre-treatment controls.

Table 6 summarizes the main pre-treatment variables used in the analysis. A section in the appendix summarizes the distribution of these attributes across 1945 administrative units and reproduces our main results with these controls.

Table 6: Summary of Pre-Treatment Characteristics (1945 Cities, Towns, and Villages)

Statistic	N	Min	Pctl(25)	Median	Pctl(75)	Max	Mean	St. Dev.
Rice Farming Area (1934)	384	?	?	?	?	?	?	?
Rice Harvest (1934)	384	?	?	?	?	?	?	?
Silkworm Production Quantity (1934)	384	?	?	?	?	?	?	?
Silkworm Price (1934)	384	?	?	?	?	?	?	?
Quantity of Arable Land (1934)	384	?	?	?	?	?	?	?
Share of Smallholder Land (193?)	384	?	?	?	?	?	?	?
Share of Rented Land (193?)	384	?	?	?	?	?	?	?
Population (1935 Census)	384	?	?	?	?	?	?	?
Arable Land Scarcity (1935)	384	?	?	?	?	?	?	?

3.3 Survey Design

3.3.1 Sample

The survey is an online survey fielded by a local survey association (Nagano Prefecture Public Opinion Association/長野県世論調査協会) to about 2000 respondents who will be a somewhat representative sample of adults in Nagano Prefecture. The inclusion criteria will be that the respondent must be over 18 years old and a resident of Nagano Prefecture.

We collected data on sex, age, profession, employment status, marriage status, educational attainment, housing status, number living in household, and living standard based on questions typically fielded by UTAS and JGSS. We also add our own questions to ask whether respondent has experienced foreign travel, travel to China, foreign friends/acquaintances, and Chinese friends/acquaintances. Table 7 summarizes the characteristics of this sample and Figure 4 shows the distribution of these respondents.


Table 7: Summary of Survey Respondent Characteristics.

Statistic	N	Min	Pctl(25)	Median	Pctl(75)	Max	Mean	St. Dev.
Sex (Male)	2000	?	?	?	?	?	?	?
Current Age	2000	?	?	?	?	?	?	?
Married	2000	?	?	?	?	?	?	?
Education (1: elementary to 6: grad school)	2000	?	?	?	?	?	?	?
Knowledge of Manchurian Settlement	2000	?	?	?	?	?	?	?
Family History of Manchurian Settlement	2000	?	?	?	?	?	?	?
Party ID (LDP=1)	2000	?	?	?	?	?	?	?
Answered Place of Origin	2000	?	?	?	?	?	?	?

3.3.2 Measuring Treatment for Exposure and Aggression Hypotheses: Respondent Place of Origin

In order to ascertain the treatment status of the respondent for the Exposure and Aggression Hypothesis, we will need to match each contemporary respondent with the 1945 administrative unit. This is no easy

Figure 4: Number of Respondents per 1945 City/Town/Village



feat, as the 384 units have now merged into a mere 74. To achieve this, we will ask the respondent to tell us the 7-digit postal code of their current residence and place of origin, which would allow us to match the respondent with a 1945 city/town/village with fairly high accuracy. If the respondent cannot remember, especially for their place of origin (seeing as this system was implemented in 1968), we will ask them for their city/town/village of origin, as well as the district within the city/town/village, which are usually called *chiku*, *myou*, or *daiji*, which would allow us to match respondents with 1945 localities. This would allow us to employ a finer treatment with more variation, but runs the danger of non-response if respondents feel their privacy is violated.

Here, respondents are shown the randomized vignette treatment, which will be explained in the experimental section. Following the vignette, respondents are asked questions about their attitudes towards different countries, stances on Sino-Japanese disputes, as well as a set of questions on nationalism, policy preferences for allowing in refugees, attitudes towards different types of foreigners moving into their locality, their job, policy preferences for allowing in foreign workers, and several other attitudinal questions.

3.4 Measuring Outcomes

To gauge attitudes towards China, we consider several aspects, including attitudes towards China as a country, Chinese people, the Chinese government, and attitudes towards particular issues relevant to Sino-Japanese relations. First, a series of questions asks familiarity towards the United States, China, Russia, South Korea, Taiwan, Vietnam, and North Korea, their governments, and their people using a 5-point Likert

Table 8: Survey questions for measuring attitudinal outcomes

Perception of Regions (US/CN/TW/RU/ROK/TW/VN/DPRK)	Outcome scale (5-point likert)
Do you feel familiarity towards these regions?	Feel familiarity/Does not feel familiarity
Do you feel familiarity towards these governments?	Feel familiarity/Does not feel familiarity
Do you feel familiarity towards the ordinary people of these regions?	Feel familiarity/Does not feel familiarity
Do you think these regions are a positive or negative influence on Japan?	Negative influence/Positive influence
Do you think that these regions pose a national security threat to Japan? Or do you not feel that they do?	Considerably feels/Does not feel at all
There are more of the following people in the community in which you live.	Agree/Disagree
Someone of the following group is getting hired at your workplace.	Agree/Disagree
Attitudes on JP-CN issues	
Japan was an aggressor in the war between China and Japan.	Agree/Disagree
The Japanese government should apologize to China regarding the war.	Agree/Disagree
The Japanese government's past apologies to China have been sufficient.	Agree/Disagree
We should strengthen our alliance with the United States based on the US-Japanese Security Treaty	Agree/Disagree
The JSDF should be employed to defend the sovereignty of the Senkaku islands if threatened	Agree/Disagree
If there is a military conflict in Taiwan, the Japanese government should aid Taiwan	Agree/Disagree
The Prime Minister of Japan should visit Yasukuni Shrine	Agree/Disagree
Attitudes towards outgroups	
Should the government increase the number of foreign workers in Japan?	Should increase greatly /Should not accept any more.
Do you think Japan should accept refugees?	Should not accept any at all. /Should accept as many as possible.

scale from "feel familiarity" to "does not feel familiarity". Second, we ask a series of questions on issues relevant to Sino-Japanese relations, in particular on agreement with statements regarding pertinent issues in Sino-Japanese relations.

We further employ several measures of attitudes towards outgroups, in particular acceptance of refugees and foreign workers. The survey question for attitudes on refugee acceptance is from Horiuchi and Ono, 2023 and the question on the general acceptance of foreign workers is from Asian Barometer Wave 5, and the question on the agreement with accepting neighbors/coworkers of a given nationality is from Igarashi and Ono, 2022. These questions are summarized in Table 8.

4 Empirical Strategy and Analysis

4.1 Instrumental Variables Approach

To test the Outgroup Tolerance Hypothesis and the Dispute Aggression Hypothesis, it is necessary to find some source of exogeneity in the treatment, which is the exposure of the locality to mortality as a result of emigration. We can obtain empirical leverage from the processes by which individuals who emigrated were settled in particular locations and the causes of different mortality/nonreturn rates across different settlements in Manchuria. We also propose another potential instrument, individual settler distance from the Soviet border.

The rate of emigration across localities in Nagano Prefecture was the result of an endogenous process of multiple policies to resettle households and individuals in Manchuria, which are in turn were closely related

to pre-treatment characteristics. Factors such as land scarcity, compliance of village heads, reliance on relief programs during the economic downturn in the early 1930s, and the compliance of local schoolteachers all drove the level of emigration according to the historical literature such as S. Kobayashi (2015). Therefore the *rate of emigration* is quite endogenous to confounding factors that are likely to affect the outcome, as is the rate of settler death/non-return for the locality of origin, since this is highly correlated with the emigration rate. However, we argue that the rate of death or non-return for *those who emigrated* across localities in Nagano can be thought of as as-if random, providing an exogenous shock to the treatment variable.

In the subsequent sections, we demonstrate how the mechanism of settlement destination and the drivers of mortality across settlements were exogenous across the emigrants’ home localities in Nagano. The settlement locations were somewhat clustered by location of origin due to systematic factors, but there was considerable mixture within each settlement location. In combination with the arbitrary drivers of mortality, I argue below that the death rate of those who emigrated from a given location in Nagano can be thought of as as-if random.

4.1.1 Mechanism of Settlement Location Choice

Unlike in many other empirical cases of emigration and settlement, destination choice was not up to the settler, but rather was largely dictated by the needs of the Kwantung Army. We focus on Agricultural Emigrants (Settlement Groups) and Youth Volunteer Corps, who make up the bulk (78 and 20% respectively) of the settlers from Nagano Prefecture, as Table 9 shows.

Table 9: Settlers by Settlement Type

Characteristic	N = 33,919 ¹
Settlement Type	
Group Sett.	26,374 (78%)
Pat. Farm	467 (1.4%)
Sec. Village	125 (0.4%)
Youth Vol. Corps	6,953 (20%)

¹n (%)

The Youth Volunteer Corps accepted boys aged 13-16 for 3 years of educational, farming, and paramilitary training in Japan and Manchuria. They were organized into companies and squads on a paramilitary basis, and the training units were intended to be settled as groups in their own settlements. For Nagano Prefecture, the first two major cohorts (1938 and 39, around 2000 recruits) were grouped into mixed units where they were formed into units on an all-Japan basis. Subsequent cohorts grouped units based on the city/county of


origin. By 1945, Nagano had sent nearly 7000 YVCs to Manchuria. At the end of the war, many of them were mobilized to work away from their training centers and settlements for war industries, building fortifications, assisting military operations, and providing supplementary labor to other agricultural settlements. Most YVC settlers who reached maturity were conscripted into the formal military, alongside conscription-age men in other types of settlements (Nagano Ken Kaitaku Jikokai Manshu Kaitakushi Kanko-kai, 1984, pp. 601–645).

For agricultural emigrants, the settlements were organized on the basis of the home village/region, or later on, on an ad-hoc basis with settlers from mixed regional backgrounds due to shortfalls in recruitment. For all such settlements, the destination would be chosen for the settlement by various entities such as the Manchurian Colonization Corporation, depending on period, in accordance with the strategic needs of the Kwantung Army at the time. Then, the settler group leaders sent a pre-settlement group to inspect the prospective settlement area a year before the main group would move in (*ibid.*, pp. 336–340).

However, while there are some examples of successful "branch villages", the demand for industrial labor arising from the China Incident in 1937 made it more difficult to recruit enough people for each settlement, resulting in settlements accepting people from outside the original village. Eventually, some settlements were recruited at the prefecture, multi-prefecture, or even national level to hit settlement targets by the 1940s, resulting in mixed compositions per settlement, and each sending village sending emigrants to multiple settlement locations in Manchuria (*ibid.*, pp. 492–555).


4.1.2 Drivers of Mortality

Figure 5: Death/Nonreturn of Japanese Settlers in Manchuria



The red and green coloring indicate the death and non-return rates of Japanese settlers respectively in Manchuria at the county level. The territorial units are 1940 counties, though the settlement and mortality data is post-1945. Areas with vertical dashed lines indicates no recorded Japanese settlements. Each dot indicates a settlement, with the darkness in color indicating the mortality or nonreturn rate for that particular settlement. Data is for all Japanese settlements rather than only ones for people from Nagano Prefecture. Settlement data from Saijo and Xu (2024) which compiled the information from Manshu Kaitakushi Kankokai Hen (1980).

Figure 6: Process of Village-level Exposure to Treatment



The same analysis will also be conducted whereupon "death" will be substituted with "non-return", which also includes those who went missing or remained in China.

Figure 5 shows the distribution of the different types of settlements and the average mortality rate for settlers from all prefectures at the county level in Manchukuo. The map and data are from Saijo and Xu (2024), which relies on the list of settlements and the fates of the settlers in *Manshuu Kaitakushi Kankokai Hen* (1980).

Generally, failure to return seems to be driven by several factors. Firsthand accounts of the harrowing journey out of Manchuria, as well as accounts of people who survived but failed to return to Japan indicate the following factors that drove death and nonreturn based on (Nagano Ken Kaitaku Jikokai Manshu Kaitakushi Kanko-kai, 1984) and (*Manshuu Kaitakushi Kankokai Hen*, 1980):

- Settlement assaulted by Soviets, local people, or CCP/KMT forces
- Mass compulsory suicide or suicide attack on Soviet forces
- Death from violence on the journey or in internment camps
- Starvation and disease in an internment camp
- Death of parents for children
- Death from internment in Soviet POW camps
- Adoption/marriage into local families (nonreturn only)
- Chose to stay in place (nonreturn only, quite rare)

If we think of these factors together, we can think of it as an idiosyncratic process where the failure to return for any individual is dependent on failure in at least one of the steps to returning alive, which were driven by both idiosyncratic (missing the last train, getting hit by a stray bullet, unlucky encounters, and so on) and systematic factors (close distance to the Soviet border, distance from railways and roads, prior relations with the local people, mass suicides, enduring internment through the winter, being given up for adoption), the locality-level death and non-return rates can be thought of as aggregations of these individual processes. Given the arbitrary nature of the settlement locations, and the distribution of emigrants from one locality in Nagano across a range of different settlements with differing fatality rates, it is reasonable to treat *death or non-return rate for those who emigrated from a given locality* as an as-if random process.

Given these drivers of the death rates of *those who emigrated*, we can be reasonably confident that it should not be driven by endogenous village characteristics, and serve as a valid instrument to estimate the effect of our treatment (rate of death or nonreturn from emigration *for the village*) on outcome. This logic is summarized in Figure 6.

Table 11: IV first stage

	Treatment Vars	
	(1) Village Nonreturn Rate	(2) Village Death Rate
Nonreturn Rate for Emigrants	? (?)	(?)
Death Rate for Emigrants	(?)	? (?)
Age	? (?)	? (?)
Gender	? (?)	? (?)
Education	? (?)	? (?)
Married	? (?)	? (?)
Adjusted R-squared	?	?
Observations	2000	2000

Note: + $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$


Table 11 shows the first stage results for the survey-respondent level relationship between the instrument and the main treatment variables among the respondents, where they were matched to their region of origin. The treatment and instrumental variables are taken from the 1945 village-level dataset described above.

4.1.3 Results: Exposure Hypothesis

In this section, we see the effect of non-return and death rate of the locality as a result of emigration on the attitudinal outcomes using the instrumental variables described above. The coefficient plots below are based on randomly generated outcomes paired with "real" treatment data from 1945 village/town/city units assigned at random.

As Figure 7 shows, the historical exposure to nonreturn and death as a result of emigration have an ??? effect on contemporary attitudes towards China. That is to say, those who are from a region with a higher experience of death or nonreturn as a result of emigration to Manchuria has more ??? attitudes towards the perpetrator group (China, the Chinese, the Chinese government, and so on), and ??? attitudes towards outgroups, such as refugees and foreign workers. The outcomes were measured on a 5-point likert scale of favorability or agreement with a statement.

Figure 7: Effect of Death/Nonreturn Rate on Attitudes towards China (2SLS Strategy)



As Figure 8 shows, the historical exposure to nonreturn and death as a result of emigration have an ??? effect on contemporary attitudes towards outgroups, with ??? effects across acceptance for refugees, foreign workers, and having Chinese as neighbors and coworkers.

4.1.4 Results: Aggression Hypothesis

The results in Figure 9 shows that the historical exposure to nonreturn and death as a result of emigration have an ??? effect on attitudes towards particular issues in Sino-Japanese relations. This shows that, in this case, exposure to collective violence actually ??? local contemporary attitudes towards China.

Figure 8: Effect of Death/Nonreturn Rate on Attitudes towards Outgroups (2SLS Strategy)





Figure 9: Effect of Death/Nonreturn Rate on Foreign Policy Aggressiveness (2SLS Strategy)




4.1.5 Three-stage Least Squares (3SLS) Instrumental Variables Design

There is still a danger that the instrument is not entirely valid. For example, home village characteristics may drive relations with local Chinese and Koreans, which can affect survival. Decisions by the settlement leadership to fight the Soviets or commit compulsive mass suicide may also be driven by village characteristics.

We can exploit the individual-level data to construct another instrument—distance from the Manchukuo-Soviet border at the individual settler level, on the basis that it would have been more difficult for people closer to the border to survive. The following map illustrates the border in question: the Soviets invaded through the green and orange borders shown below in August 1945, and each of the dots represents a Japanese settlement (including settlers from all prefectures) taken from Saijo and Xu, 2024.

We can use the border distance to construct a survival likelihood for *each individual settler*, aggregate that across villages to generate a village-level predicted death/nonreturn rate of those who emigrated based on the location of the settlers from that village. Most villages sent settlers to multiple locations, as Table 3

Figure 10: Soviet Border and Settlement-Level Death Rate



shows, with some villages sending settlers to up to 33 destinations, with the median village sending settlers to 11 locations. We then use that predicted quantity as the instrument for death/nonreturn rates from emigration for that village and run the same analysis as in the main analysis. This logic is outlined in Figure 11.

At this stage, we can show that this approach may be *plausible*; Table 12 shows that at the *settlement* level, including settlers from all prefectures in Japan and not just Nagano, the distance to Soviet border is a reasonable predictor of settlement-level death and nonreturn in this dataset. The correlation becomes more significant when controlling for distance to railway lines, which was a vital escape route for those lucky enough to reach it in time. To fully implement this approach, we would need to further clean the individual-level settler data from Nagano (the data summarized in Table 4) and match the settlement locations with the documented settlement locations shown in Figure 10, which has yet to be implemented.

The results of the 3SLS analysis that will be included in the appendix show ??? and are ??? with the main results from the two-stage IV analysis.

Figure 11: Logic of the Three-Stage IV




Table 12: Correlation between distance to border and settler death rate for settlers from all prefectures

	DV: death rate of emigrants			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Distance to Manchuria-USSR border	-0.124 ⁺ (0.063)			-0.145* (0.056)
Distance to Manchuria-Mongolia border		0.048 (0.049)		
Distance to Railway			0.307 (0.184)	0.347 ⁺ (0.176)
R2_a	0.01	0.00	0.02	0.03
Observations	901	901	901	901

Note: ⁺ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

4.2 Experimental Approach

In this section, we employ an experimental approach to test the plausibility of our explanation for the historical legacy effect demonstrated above. If the balanced framing is one channel that is determining the direction of the effect of collective violence, we should expect that balanced framing should have a greater effect than no framing, victimization framing, or perpetrator framing. If we were to find that the balanced framing treatment has little effect, or the effect is not so different from the victimization or perpetrator framing, it would be an indication that balanced framing likely is not what is driving the relationship between past victimization and contemporary attitudes that we demonstrated in the previous section. Furthermore, if it turns out that the victimization framing is mainly driving the outcome, it would be evidence in favor of the idea that *recognition of victimhood* may be driving the relationship, as shown in (Dinas, Fouka, and

Schläpfer, 2021b) regarding the the attitudes of the descendants of German expellees towards recent refugees in contemporary Germany.

4.2.1 Applying Treatment for Vignette Experiment

The treatments in the vignette experiment follow the four-part schema introduce in Table 1, with vignette treatments corresponding to no framing, victim framing, perpetrator framing, and balanced framing.

Following basic questions, all respondents will be shown the following text:

以下で現代の日中関係や日本の国際問題についての意見を伺います。

We will ask you some questions about contemporary Sino-Japanese relations, as well as international issues for Japan.

Then, respondents will be assigned to one of four treatments shown below. One of the following four will be shown to the respondent at random:

1. Perpetration Framing:

長野県は旧満洲（現・中国東北部）に多数の入植者を送り出しました。そこで現地の中国人の土地を収奪しました。このようにこれらの課題は長野県の人々にとってとくに関連深いとも言えます。

These issues are especially relevant for people in Nagano. Nagano Prefecture sent many agricultural emigrants to ex-Manchuria (now Northeast China) and expropriated land from Chinese people.

2. Victim Framing:

長野県は旧満洲（現・中国東北部）に多数の入植者を送り出しました。そこで現地の中国人による襲撃などによって終戦時に多数の犠牲者が出ました。このようにこれらの課題は長野県の人々にとってとくに関連深いとも言えます。

These issues are especially relevant for people in Nagano. Nagano Prefecture sent many agricultural emigrants to ex-Manchuria (now Northeast China) and there were many casualties from Chinese attacks.

3. Balanced Framing:

長野県は旧満洲（現・中国東北部）に多数の入植者を送り出しました。そこで現地の中国人の土地を収奪しました。さらに、現地の中国人による襲撃などによって終戦時に多数の犠牲者が出ました。このようにこれらの課題は長野県の人々にとってとくに関連深いとも言えます。

These issues are especially relevant for people in Nagano. Nagano Prefecture sent many agricultural emigrants to ex-Manchuria (now Northeast China) and expropriated land from Chinese people. Furthermore there were many casualties from Chinese attacks.

4. No Framing:

長野県は旧満洲（現・中国東北部）に多数の入植者を送り出しました。このようにこれらの課題は長野県の人々にとってとくに関連深いとも言えます。

These issues are especially relevant for people in Nagano. Nagano Prefecture sent many agricultural emigrants to ex-Manchuria (now Northeast China).

The first vignette shows treatment which frames Japanese as perpetrators. The third frames Japanese as victims. The third frames Japanese as both victims and perpetrators, connecting both ideas. The final vignette simply states that many people from Nagano settled in Manchuria, without framing Japanese settlers as victims or perpetrators.

4.2.2 Analysis: Balanced Framing Hypothesis

Figure 12 shows the effect of the three framing in comparison to the "no framing" treatment. We see that the balanced framing treatment is ??? significantly ??? from the baseline, and is also ??? significantly ??? from the victim and perpetrator frames, providing evidence for the plausibility of the idea that balanced framing is driving the historical legacy effect.

Given our sample size is 2000 and three treatment groups and one control group, each group will be approximately 500 individuals. In the analysis, we effectively make pairwise comparisons between each one of the three treatment groups and the control group. Thus, taking the standard deviation in Japanese respondents' favorability towards China from an existing study ³, overall N of 1000, the probability that we would not mistakenly fail to reject the null hypothesis if a true positive were true, is 0.95 for an effect size of 0.25, which is higher than the commonly accepted standard of 0.8.

4.2.3 Analysis: Conditional Balanced Framing Hypothesis

In Figure 13, we see the conditional effect of the framing treatments across those who have family history of emigration to Manchuria and those without, as well as the effect of the framing treatments conditional on the degree to which the respondent's locality was exposed to nonreturn or death as a result of emigration. If our proposed mechanism were correct, it would follow that those with a personal connection with the events should see a stronger effect than those who were merely exposed to it through secondary sources such as mass media and peace education programs. Were this to be the case, the interaction effect between balanced framing and the presence of settler relatives should be positive and significant. Furthermore, the interaction between balanced framing and nonreturn rate in the locality of origin should also be significant and positive.

³In the 2023 Sasakawa Peace Foundation's survey on Japanese views of other countries, favorability to China for a nationally representative sample of 3000 returned a mean rating of 0.89 on a 1-5 point scale with 5 most favorable, and standard deviation

5 Discussion

[to be written at a later date]

1.09, indicating very low levels of favorability towards China among Japanese respondents.

Figure 12: Effect of Balanced Framing on Attitudes (Vignette Experiment)







Figure 13: Conditional Effect of Framing on Attitudes (Vignette Experiment)



References

- Adelman, Levi et al. (2016). “A whole other story: Inclusive victimhood narratives reduce competitive victimhood and intergroup hostility”. In: *Personality and social psychology bulletin* 42.10, pp. 1416–1430.
- Araragi, Shinzo (1994). *Manshu Imin no Rekishi Shakaigaku [Historical Sociology of Emigration to Manchuria]*. Kohrosha.
- Balcells, Laia (2012). “The consequences of victimization on political identities: Evidence from Spain”. In: *Politics & Society* 40.3, pp. 311–347.
- Bilali, Rezarta and Johanna Ray Vollhardt (2019). “Victim and perpetrator groups’ divergent perspectives on collective violence: Implications for intergroup relations”. In: *Political Psychology* 40, pp. 75–108.
- Dinas, Elias, Vasiliki Fouka, and Alain Schl pfer (2021a). “Family history and attitudes toward out-groups: Evidence from the European refugee crisis”. In: *The journal of politics* 83.2, pp. 647–661.
- (2021b). “Recognition of collective victimhood and outgroup prejudice”. In: *Public opinion quarterly* 85.2, pp. 517–538.
- Fouka, Vasiliki and Hans-Joachim Voth (2023). “Collective remembrance and private choice: German–Greek conflict and behavior in times of crisis”. In: *American Political Science Review* 117.3, pp. 851–870.
- Hadzic, Dino and Margit Tavits (2019). “The gendered effects of violence on political engagement”. In: *The Journal of Politics* 81.2, pp. 676–680.
- Horiuchi, Yusaku and Yoshikuni Ono (2023). “Susceptibility to threatening information and attitudes toward refugee resettlement: The case of Japan”. In: *Journal of Peace Research* 60.3, pp. 459–473.
- Igarashi, Akira and Yoshikuni Ono (2022). “Neoliberal ideology and negative attitudes toward immigrants: Evidence from a survey and survey experiment in Japan”. In: *Journal of Applied Social Psychology* 52.12, pp. 1146–1157.
- Iida City Historical Research Institute (2009). *Manshu Imin: Iida Shimoina Kara no Messeeji [Manchurian Emigration: Message from Iida Shimoina]*. Gendai Shiryo Shuppan. ISBN: 4877852026.
- Kobayashi, Hideo (1976). “Manshuu Nougyou Imin no Einou Jittai [The Reality of Operating Agriculture for Agricultural Immigrants to Manchuria]”. In: *Nihon Teikokushugika no Manshuu Imin [Immigration to Manchuria under Japanese Imperialism]*. Ed. by Manshuu Iminshi Kenkyuukai. Tokyo: Ryuuukei Shosha. Chap. 5, pp. 387–484.
- Kobayashi, Shinsuke (2015). *Hitobito wa naze Manshu e watatta no ka: Nagano-ken no shakai undo to imin [Why did people emigrate to Manchuria: Social Movements in Nagano Prefecture and Emigration]*. Sekai Shisosha, Kyoto.
- Koga, Makito (2006). *Kindai Nihon sensoshi jiten [Dictionary of Modern Japanese War]*. Koyo Shuppansha.

- Lee, Jooyoun (2018). “Yasukuni and Hiroshima in clash? War and peace museums in contemporary Japan”. In: *Pacific Focus* 33.1, pp. 5–33.
- Lupu, Noam and Leonid Peisakhin (2017). “The legacy of political violence across generations”. In: *American Journal of Political Science* 61.4, pp. 836–851.
- Manshuu Kaitakushi Kankokai Hen (1980). *Manshu Kaitakushi [History of Settlement in Manchuria]*. Manshuu Kaitakushi Kankokai.
- Menon, Anil (2023). “The political legacy of forced migration: Evidence from post-WWII Germany”. In: *Comparative Political Studies* 56.9, pp. 1398–1432.
- Nagano Ken Kaitaku Jikokai Manshu Kaitakushi Kanko-kai (1984). *Nagano-ken Manshu Kaitakushi Sohen [Nagano Prefecture History of Manchurian Settlement, General Section]*. Nagano Ken Kaitaku Jikokai Manshu Kaitakushi Kanko-kai.
- Nagano-ken Kenko Fukushibu Chiiki Fukushima (2022). *Naagno-ken no Senso ni Tsuite Shirou [Let us Learn About the Nagano Prefecture and the War]*. Nagano-ken Kenko Fukushibu Chiiki Fukushima.
- Paine, Sarah CM (2015). “Japanese Puppet-State Building in Manchukuo”. In: *Nation Building, State Building, and Economic Development*. Routledge, pp. 66–82.
- Patrikeeff, Felix, Bruce A Elleman, and Stephen Kotkin (2002). “Railway as political catalyst: The Chinese eastern railway and the 1929 Sino-Soviet conflict”. In: *Manchurian Railways and the Opening of China: An International History*, pp. 81–103.
- Rozenas, Arturas, Sebastian Schutte, and Yuri Zhukov (2017). “The political legacy of violence: The long-term impact of Stalin’s repression in Ukraine”. In: *The Journal of Politics* 79.4, pp. 1147–1161.
- Saijo, Harunobu and Jing Xu (2024). “Legacies of Colonial Land Expropriation on Postcolonial Political Violence”. In: *Working Paper*.
- Takamatsu-shi Heiwa Kinenkan (2019). *Takamatshu-shi Heiwa Kinenkan Leaflet [Takamatsu Municipal Peace Memorial Museum Leaflet]*. Takamatsu-shi Heiwa Kinenkan.
- Vollhardt, Johanna Ray (2009). “Altruism born of suffering and prosocial behavior following adverse life events: A review and conceptualization”. In: *Social Justice Research* 22, pp. 53–97.
- Wayne, Carly and Yuri M Zhukov (2022). “Never again: The holocaust and political legacies of genocide”. In: *World Politics* 74.3, pp. 367–404.
- Young, Isaac F and Daniel Sullivan (2016). “Competitive victimhood: A review of the theoretical and empirical literature”. In: *Current Opinion in Psychology* 11, pp. 30–34.
- Zao, Yanmin (2016). *Manshu Imin no Rekishi to Kioku Ichi Kaitaku Dannai no Raifu Hisutori Kara Miru Sono Taseisei [History and Memory of Manchurian Emigration: Diversity as Seen Through the Life Histories of One Settlement Group]*. Akashi Shoten. ISBN: 9784750343792.

Appendix


Table of Contents

A City, Town, and Village Pretreatment Characteristics	A-2
B Robustness Check	A-2

A City, Town, and Village Pretreatment Characteristics

Figure A.1 shows the geographical distribution of rented land as a share of arable land, and land scarcity in 1934/35. We will run analysis for our main findings with these controls as a robustness check in this section.

Figure A.1: Pretreatment Characteristics



B Robustness Check

In this section, we will run several robustness checks, including testing and accounting for spatial autocorrelation Moran's I and reproducing our main findings using SAR/SEM models if we detect significant spatial autocorrelation.